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JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE: AN
EVALUATION OF ONE CLINIC’S
ABILITY TO HARMONIZE TEACHING
PRACTICAL SKILLS, ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONALISM WITH A SOCIAL
JUSTICE MISSION
LAUREN CARASIK*
A number of developments have firmly established the role of clinics
in legal education, allowing law school clinicians greater latitude in
designing programs consistent with law school curricular values and
priorities.
Consequently, current law school clinical offerings are
comprised of richly varied structures and goals. A myriad of goals fall
under the general rubric of clinical legal education. Among the most
widely cited goals are providing practical skills training in a real world
context, instilling a public interest ethos in students, advancing social
justice, encouraging the critique of the law and legal institutions,
inculcating high standards of ethics and professionalism and imparting the
habit of self-reflective lawyering.
Clinical educators are not monolithic in their approach to issues of
clinic goals and design, and many clinicians would be pleased to construct
a clinic that equalizes and integrates all of these laudable goals. Not
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surprisingly, achieving perfect balance is quixotic. As with the design of
any course, clinicians face difficult curricular choices. The tension
between the important social justice considerations and the premium on
practical skills and professionalism training is intensified by resource
limitations that confront many law schools. Because no clinic can
incorporate every worthy and compelling clinical goal, each clinician must
strive to identify and balance multiple objectives and values in a
thoughtful, deliberate way.
In light of the widespread concern bemoaning the inadequate access to
legal representation for those at the bottom of our nation’s socioeconomic
ladder, many clinicians espouse the pivotal role of a social justice mission
in law school clinics. As wealth becomes more stratified1 and access to the
legal system more severely restricted,2 law schools have a moral obligation
not only to raise awareness of unequal access to justice,3 but to identify and

1. Judith Goode & Jeff Maskovsky, Introduction to THE NEW POVERTY STUDIES: THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF POWER, POLITICS, AND IMPOVERISHED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (Judith
Goode & Jeff Maskovsky eds., 2001) (“At the economic level, the gap between rich and poor has
widened to an unprecedented distance, both in the United States and worldwide, over the last three
decades.”); see also Henry Rose, Retrospective on Justice and the Poor in the United States in the
Twentieth Century, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 591 (2005).
2. The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) undertook a study to determine the extent to which
low-income Americans were unable to secure access to civil legal assistance. The report,
“Documenting the Justice Gap in America—The Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income
Americans,” concluded that “[a]lthough state and private support for legal assistance to the poor has
increased in the last two decades, level (or declining after factoring in inflation) federal funding and an
increased poverty population have served to increase the unmet demand.” LEGAL SERVICES CORP.,
Overview of DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA—THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS
OF
LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS
2,
http://www.lsc.gov/press/documents/JusticeGapReportOverview120105.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2006)
(quoting
report
overview;
full
report
available
at
http://www.lsc.gov/press/documents/LSC%20Justice%20Gap_FINAL_1001.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2006)). The overview notes that the researchers finished collecting data in August 2005, so “none of
the data in the report reflects the vastly increased need for legal assistance that will result from the
impact of Hurricane Katrina by a greatly expanded client-eligible population.” Id.
3. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Again, Still, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1013, 1021 (2004)
(“[M]ost legal academics have done little to educate themselves, the profession, or the public about
access to justice and the strategies necessary to increase it . . . . [W]e are not shouting from rooftops
about unmet needs; we are not, for the most part, even murmuring in classrooms or muttering in law
reviews.”); see also John O. Calmore, Social Justice Advocacy in the Third Dimension: Addressing the
Problem of “Preservation-Through-Transformation,” 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 615, 632 (2004) (“[L]aw
school fails to produce public spirited and socially responsible lawyers . . . .”).
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implement strategies aimed at ameliorating these pervasive inequities.4
Law school clinics are ideally situated to serve at the vanguard of this
social justice mission. As the driving force in clinic design and goals,
clinical faculty must aspire to be “Provocateurs for Justice.”5 Given the
relative expense of clinical programs, law schools cannot be complacent in
supporting a clinical mission that is merely adequately conceived and
should set priorities that advance critical social justice goals. This article
assumes an expansive definition of social justice that extends beyond both
procedural access to justice and an equitable, just outcome in a particular
case. This broad definition of a social justice mission encompasses a
transformative agenda aimed at identifying and implementing advocacy
strategies that provide enduring, meaningful and systemic relief for
marginalized communities.6 The notion that the dynamics of the lawyerclient relationship should not replicate the social and political subordination
imposed on clients elsewhere in their lives is implicit in this social justice
agenda. Given the incalculable costs of indifference to fundamental
questions of justice and fair play, it is incumbent on law schools to rise to
the challenge of integrating social justice considerations into their clinical
mission.7

4. See Stephen Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School Clinics in
Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 1011 (2004).
In order to increase the number of law school graduates who embrace a professional
responsibility to assure access to justice for the poor, clinicians must strive to inculcate in
their students an understanding and compassionate concern for the plight of people living in
poverty, and a sense of professional responsibility for increasing their access to justice.
Id. See also DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 191-93 (2004), for a discussion about the
responsibility of legal educators to instill professional values. “Legal education plays an important role
in socializing the next generation of lawyers, judges, and public policymakers. As gatekeepers to the
profession, law schools have a unique opportunity and obligation to make access to justice a more
central social priority.” Id. at 193.
5. Jane H. Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 287, 288 (2001) (“A
provocateur for justice actively imbues . . . students with a lifelong learning about justice, prompts them
to name injustice, to recognize the role they may play in the perpetuation of injustice and to work
toward a legal solution to that injustice.”).
6. The Equal Justice Project rejected limiting its objectives to increasing “access to justice,” and
instead identified “equal justice” as a far more visionary and substantive goal; “[t]he Project eschewed
the term ‘access to justice’ in its planning literature in the belief that access to the legal system, though
critical to many when meaningful, did not capture the full range of legal inequality that affects people
and communities . . . .” EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT, ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., PURSUING EQUAL JUSTICE:
LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES 3 (2002), available at
http://www.aals.org/equaljustice/final_report.pdf [hereinafter EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT].
7. See generally Symposium, The Justice Mission of American Law Schools, 40 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 277 (1992) (providing commentary on the social justice mission of law schools).
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While the ability of law schools to promote a social justice mission
through their clinical programming is well documented,8 balancing the
competing goals of providing skills training and furthering a social justice
agenda within the confines of one particular clinic construct is less studied.
This article considers one clinician’s efforts to evaluate and reconcile the
tension between these goals.9 In order to create a collective body of
knowledge about pursuing social justice goals within clinical pedagogy,
clinicians are exhorted to document and disseminate their experiences.10
During the time I evaluated the civil clinic, Western New England
College School of Law (WNEC), which is the only law school in Western
Massachusetts, employed two full-time clinicians and offered five clinics,
one practicum and an externship program. The Anti-Discrimination Clinic,
the only civil clinic supervised by a full-time clinician, operated as a hybrid
model.11 Under my supervision, students served as Volunteer Commission

8. See, e.g., Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV.
1461 (1998).
9. Clinicians may need to temper their idealism in articulating dramatic social justice objectives
with more pragmatic considerations. These include ensuring opportunities to provide training in a
reasonable range of lawyering skills, as well as other contingencies, such as the constraints imposed by
limitations on institutional resources, loyalty to existing clinical programs, the clinician’s own area of
expertise, student interest, the opportunities and demand present in the local community, and the
challenges and uncertainty of determining the clinic structure most likely to achieve social justice goals.
See, e.g., Douglas A. Blaze, Déjà Vu All Over Again: Reflections on Fifty Years of Clinical Education,
64 TENN. L. REV. 939, 953 (1997) (“[I]t is important . . . that community service fall within the proper
scope of law school educational activity to the extent that service affords demonstrably sound,
pedagogic opportunities for the education of law students.”).
10. See EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 6, at 23 (“Combining personal belief, passion, and
intellectual integrity, equal justice scholarship provides fulfilling opportunities for synthesizing
teaching, scholarship, and service. When grounded in social movements, this scholarship has real
potential for affecting change.”). See also Irene Scharf, Nourishing Justice and the Continuum:
Implementing a Blended Model in an Immigration Law Clinic, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 243 (2005), for
reflections on a clinician’s experience designing and directing an immigration law clinic. Scharf noted
the tension between some critics of clinical scholarship who characterize it as too pedestrian and those
who reproach it as inaccessible to all but a few academics who are familiar with its impenetrable prose
and theoretical abstractions. Id. at 245 n.5. In chronicling her efforts to develop a clinic that balances a
service mission with attention to the ongoing nature of legal education, Scharf hoped to strike a middle
ground between these competing visions of clinical scholarship, thereby offering “constructive
assistance to law faculty who are struggling to develop high-quality models of education and service in
an atmosphere of limited finances.” Id. I share the hope that this article adds to the body of literature
providing guidance to clinicians striving to balance social justice goals with other pedagogical
concerns.
11. There is no single definition of what constitutes a hybrid clinic, although it typically contains
components of both in-house clinics and externship programs. See Margaret A. (Peggy) Tonon, Beauty
and the Beast—Hybrid Prosecution Externships in a Non-Urban Setting, 74 MISS. L.J. 1043, 1048
(2005). In many hybrid clinics, both the clinic faculty member and an on-site supervisor share the
responsibility to supervise students. In what I will refer to as the MCAD model, I retained full
responsibility to train and supervise the clinic students, and students assumed primary professional
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Counsel to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
(MCAD), the state administrative agency charged with enforcing the state’s
discrimination laws.12
This article critically reflects on the AntiDiscrimination Clinic’s ability to provide an optimum balance between
skills training and a social justice mission, and illustrates the challenges of
satisfying a social justice mission in a clinic operating within the
limitations of administrative agency practice.
This article is comprised of four parts. Part I briefly explores the
evolution of clinical education, with particular emphasis on synthesizing
skills training and social justice issues, and describes some recent
developments underscoring the urgency of developing a comprehensive
plan to address social justice issues.13 Part II briefly surveys a few relevant
developments in contemporary progressive lawyering theories that provide
a context for a critique of the Anti-Discrimination Clinic. Part III describes
the Anti-Discrimination Clinic, and examines how the clinic balanced the
demands of current clinical pedagogy, including providing training in
practical skills, ethics and professionalism, against the law school’s social
justice mission, which was premised in part on the progressive lawyering
theories discussed in Part II. This evaluation considers the context of the
law school’s overall clinical programming. The article concludes that
while WNEC’s Anti-Discrimination Clinic presented some valuable
teaching opportunities, operating within the framework of this particular
state agency hampered the realization of critically important pedagogical
and social justice goals. Prominent among these unrealized goals was the
law school’s failure to ameliorate the vast landscape of unmet legal needs
confronting indigent clients. Also particularly troubling was the clinic’s
subordination of the individual complainant’s goals and interests to the
vaguely defined “public interest” goals of the state agency, which modeled
habits in direct conflict with client empowerment strategies. The analysis
of this clinic’s efficacy in advancing social justice goals may be useful in
guiding other clinicians who are contemplating clinic design with an
administrative agency. Part IV briefly describes an unsuccessful attempt to
remedy these shortcomings.
responsibility for the cases. Rather than represent individual clients, we served as counsel to the
administrative agency.
12. The clinic students and I filed a Notice of Appearance in the cases, serving in the same role
as MCAD Commission Counsel. For a description of the clinic and the specific role of the students, see
discussion infra Part III.
13. This article does not intend to articulate a comprehensive, groundbreaking analysis of topics
on which clinical scholarship abounds. Instead, the goal is to briefly explicate the relevant emerging
clinical pedagogy and social justice lawyering theory in order to provide the context for an informed
critique of the Anti-Discrimination Clinic.
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I. CLINICAL EDUCATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
A. BRIEF HISTORY AND RECENT TRAJECTORY OF CLINICAL EDUCATION
The value of clinical instructional methodology, through experiential
education, has been firmly established as an integral component of legal
education. The ABA mandates that law schools provide clinical or field
placement opportunities,14 and clinics now exist at virtually all law
schools.15 As many clinicians have prioritized social justice goals,
innovative clinics have flourished. Because the roots of clinical legal
education have been thoroughly recounted in innumerable articles, this
article will focus briefly on the origin, maturation and refinement of
clinical pedagogy necessary to provide a context for a critique of the clinic
structure and goals at WNEC.
In its initial incarnation, legal training was premised on instruction in
applied skills imparted through the apprentice model or lectures delivered
through the didactic classroom model.16 By the 1890s, law school
pedagogy shifted to the dominance of the method popularized by
Christopher Columbus Langdell, known as the case method.17 This
instructional technique, designed to teach students “how to think like
lawyers,”18 elevated the concept of “law as science,” in which good
lawyering skills were presumed to rely exclusively on the lawyer’s ability
to predict the application of appellate decisions to specific facts.19 The

14. ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS Standard 302(b)(1) (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/chapter3.html.
15. David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest
Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209, 236 (2003) (noting that 182 law schools employ over 1400 clinicians in
clinics covering 130 different subject areas). Despite uniform incorporation into law school offerings,
clinical education is not without its detractors, including those who see the academy as a place of
intellectual rigor that should not deign to dilute its mission by providing pedestrian training in
lawyering skills, which they fear would render the legal academy little more than a trade school. See
Suzanne Valdez Carey, An Essay on the Evolution of Clinical Legal Education and Its Impact on
Student Trial Practice, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 509, 509 (2003) (stating that due in part to this criticism,
law schools were slow to adopt clinical programs).
16. Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law School
Methodology in the 21ST Century, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 449, 451-52 (1996).
17. See Margaret Martin Barry et al., Clinical Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7
CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 5 n.7 (2000).
18. See Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. the Case Method: A Marvelous Adventure
in Which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 351, 358-59 (1998) (citing Steven
I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching Techniques in American Law Schools, 20 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1, 20-21(1996)).
19. Some critics of the case method reject the presumption that legal analysis could be reduced to
“the collection, synthesis, and analytical comparison of common law . . . that could be consistently
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ascendancy of the Langdellian method eclipsed the past reliance on the
apprentice method, leaving little opportunity for law students to acquire
practical skills.20 By the 1930s, several prominent and outspoken legal
scholars questioned the value of the Langdellian methodology as the
exclusive training offered to lawyers, and proposed the widespread
adoption of more practical skills training.
Jerome Frank,21 Karl
22
Llewellyn and others argued that in assuming that the proficient practice
of law depended entirely on a lawyer’s ability to understand and apply the
principle of stare decisis, traditional teaching methodologies left lawyers
wholly unprepared to deal effectively with contingencies not contained
within the narrow and predictable sphere of appellate analysis. Frank
proposed the implementation of clinics as an integral part of legal
education that would serve as a foundation for a more realistic method of
providing comprehensive lawyering skills instruction.23 Despite the
support for the expansion of legal training, clinical education did not
immediately gain any significant foothold in the academy.24
Although clinical training had been present in the academy for years,
the 1960s ushered in a watershed in clinical legal education.25 A number of
applied in predicting results and deciding future cases.” Bernard K. Freamon, Action Research for
Justice in Newark, New Jersey, in EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL VALUES AND LEGAL EDUCATION
167, 169-70 (Jeremy Cooper & Louise G. Trubek eds., 1997).
20. See Blaze, supra note 9, at 943-44.
21. See Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933)
[hereinafter Frank, Why Not]; Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947)
[hereinafter Frank, Plea]. Frank proposed modifying the law school methodology to more closely
follow the medical school model.
22. Legal realists believed that “legal education should expose students to the dynamic
relationship between theory and practice—that good theory is practical, and that good practice is
informed by theory.” Stephen Wizner, The Law School Clinic: Legal Education in the Interests of
Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1929, 1932 (2002).
23. See Frank, Plea, supra note 21; see also Blaze, supra note 9, at 945-948 (noting that early
proponents argued that clinical pedagogy could provide invaluable educational benefits that extend
beyond the practical skills training previously imparted through the apprenticeship method.).
24. Barry et al. attribute the legal academy’s resistance to fully embracing clinical education to
four factors. Barry et al., supra note 17, at 8-9. First, law schools believed that their desire to be fully
identified with the intellectual rigors of the academy required them to distance themselves from the
apprenticeship method. See id. at 8. Second, law schools were under-funded and unable to even
consider the cost-prohibitive adoption of clinics. See id. Third, there was far from universal agreement
among law school faculty about the wisdom of providing training beyond pure legal analysis. Id.
Finally, during the period from the 1920s to the 1940s when the American Bar Association strove to
elevate and consolidate standards for law schools, there was no overt or even tacit encouragement for
law schools to develop clinical programming. See id. at 8-9. These factors continued to impede the
adoption and incorporation of clinics through the 1950s, and although some clinics existed, they were
often considered extracurricular activities rather than academic offerings. See id. at 9-10.
25. See id. at 12-13 (noting that by the 1960s, clinics had become an institutionalized part of
some law school curricula); see also Wizner, supra note 22, at 1933 (recounting the work done by the
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factors influenced this shift, including the increasingly politicized social
climate, vocal student demand for the social relevance of their studies, the
availability of some funding for clinics, faculty interest in teaching clinical
topics,26 and, starting in the 1970s, the incipient development of a distinct
clinical instructional methodology.27 During that time, the clinical
movement was most visibly and forcefully advanced by the advocacy of
William Pincus, vice president of the Ford Foundation. Pincus created a
program now known as the Council on Legal Education and Professional
Responsibility (CLEPR), which aspired to provide legal services to the
poor.28 With an initial $6 million, “Pincus set out on his crusade to
transform American legal education.”29 CLEPR funded several law school
clinics, which facilitated the development and consolidation of clinical
pedagogy that was intentionally and explicitly fused with a social justice
agenda.30 During this era of clinical education, “[c]linics were about skills
training, providing service, influencing policy, and developing future legal
aid and civil rights lawyers.”31
By the 1980s, many clinical educators campaigned for a less
marginalized role in the academy, seeking greater acceptance and

Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility starting in the late 1960s). Commentators
attribute various factors to this rise in clinical education: criticism emanating from legal realists, the end
of the apprentice system and the legal aid movement. Blaze, supra note 9, at 943-45.
26. Barry et al., supra note 17, at 12.
27. Id. at 16 (asserting that while the social unrest of the 1960s was a catalyst to the expansion of
clinical programs, “it was the development of a clinical teaching methodology that was critical in
solidifying the place of clinical legal education in the law school curriculum during the period running
from the 1970’s through the present”).
28. Id. at 18-19.
29. Wizner, supra note 22, at 1933.
30. See Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 338 (2001) (“From the
beginning of the clinical legal education movement, experiential learning and skills-training were seen
as the means for achieving the justice goal articulated by William Pincus, not as ends in themselves.”);
see also Wizner & Aiken, supra note 4, at 998 (“[C]linics began at many law schools primarily as
programs to enable law students to provide free legal services to the poor or to bring important impact
litigation . . . .”).
31. Wizner & Aiken, supra note 4, at 998. At that time, the ABA issued its Model Student
Practice Rule, with many states following suit, in order to provide legal services and an opportunity for
student learning. According to some observers, the decision to limit representation to the poor was in
part a pragmatic effort to placate the private bar’s concern that clinics would compete for fee-paying
clients. See David F. Chavkin, Am I My Client’s Lawyer?: Role Definition and the Clinical Supervisor,
51 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1516 n.28 (1998) (explaining that most states limit student representation to
indigent clients). Navigating the balance between learning and service has been a challenge from the
inception of clinical legal education. See Blaze, supra note 9, at 950-52. Nevertheless, service has
always been an integral component of clinical education.
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integration of clinical pedagogy in the law school curriculum.32 There
were some for whom this quest for legitimacy elevated the primacy of
skills training and displaced the social justice mission of clinics.33 This
trend dovetailed with widespread concerns about the competence and ethics
of new attorneys, and prompted a comprehensive evaluation of the
structure and efficacy of legal training.34 The results of this evaluation
were cataloged in what became known as the MacCrate Report,35 which
attempted to create a taxonomy of skills and values necessary to lawyering,
and implored law schools to “narrow the gap” between law graduates and
the practicing bar.36 In addition to enumerating specific lawyering skills,
the MacCrate Report also identified important normative goals, including
the Provision of Competent Representation; Striving to Promote Justice,
Fairness, and Morality; Striving to Improve the Profession; and

32. See Minna J. Kotkin, The Law School Clinic: A Training Ground for Public Interest
Lawyers, in EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL VALUES AND LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 19, at 129,
137-38.
33. See id. at 138. The recalibrated focus has been attributed to a variety of factors. One
influence was a change in the ideals of the students entering law school, which was reflected in a more
careerist and less politicized student body. Id. at 137. Accordingly, “[i]ncoming law students lacked
the ideological commitment of their predecessors to a vision of law as a tool of empowerment for the
poor and disadvantaged.” Id. Moreover, clinicians seeking greater parity with their doctrinal
colleagues often faced scholarship and other requirements, which decreased the time available to
dedicate to live-client representation. Id. at 138. Finally, some clinicians were less committed to law
reform efforts than their predecessors. Id. Scholars have reflected on the implications of this shift, and
Wizner and Aiken query, “Have we [clinicians], in our struggle to become accepted as members of law
school faculties, compromised our identities as advocates for the poor and unprivileged, as fighters for
social justice?” Wizner & Aiken, supra note 4, at 1002; see also Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report
Turns 10: Assessing Its Impact and Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REV.
109, 169 (2001) (concluding that “teaching . . . fundamental lawyering skills and values to help prepare
law graduates for practice” is a burden to be borne not solely by clinics, but law schools as a whole).
34. See Kotkin, supra note 32, at 138.
[T]he organized bar was increasingly pressuring law schools to provide essential skills
training, particularly as employers saw these efforts on their own part as not economically
advantageous.
Thus, once perceived as a radically new teaching methodology that also infused
ideological social goals into law schools, clinical legal education began to serve very different
ends: career development for students and efficiency for the private bar.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
35. TASK FORCE ON LAW SCH. & THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, ABA, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 3-8 (1992) (report
issued by the Task Force, which was established by the ABA Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar and was headed by Robert MacCrate) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT].
36. See id. at 138-40 (identifying ten fundamental lawyering skills: Problem Solving, Legal
Analysis and Reasoning, Legal Research, Factual Investigation, Communication, Counseling,
Negotiation, Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures, Organization and Management
of Legal Work, and Recognizing and Resolving Ethical Dilemmas).
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Professional Self-Development.37 Stressing the importance of these values,
the MacCrate Report commented that they “are at least as important as the
substance of courses or the skills of practice.”38 The report, which
galvanized clinical educators, exhorted law school professors to “assist
students to recognize the responsibility of lawyers to advance individual
and social justice.”39
During the 1990s, many clinicians embraced a renewed commitment
to the clinical movement’s social justice roots, emboldened in part by the
MacCrate Report.40 In the initial five years after its publication, the

37. Id. at 140-41. Regarding the second normative goal—“Striving to Promote Justice, Fairness,
and Morality”—the MacCrate Report states that lawyers should be committed to the values of:
2.1 Promoting Justice, Fairness, and Morality in One’s Own Daily Practice, including:
(a) To the extent required or permitted by the ethical rules of the profession, acting in
conformance with considerations of justice, fairness, and morality when making
decisions or acting on behalf of a client;
(b) To the extent required or permitted by the ethical rules of the profession, counseling
clients to take considerations of justice, fairness, and morality into account when the
client makes decisions or engages in conduct that may have an adverse effect on other
individuals or on society;
(c) Treating other people (including clients, other attorneys, and support personnel) with
dignity and respect;
2.2 Contributing to the Profession’s Fulfillment of its Responsibility to Ensure that Adequate
Legal Services Are Provided to Those Who Cannot Afford to Pay for Them;
2.3 Contributing to the Profession’s Fulfillment of its Responsibility to Enhance the Capacity
of Law and Legal Institutions to Do Justice.
Id. at 213 (citations omitted). But cf. Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach “Justice, Fairness, and
Morality,” 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 6-10 (1997) (arguing that although the MacCrate Report identifies
“promoting justice, fairness, and morality” as core values, this imperative has not been uniformly
embraced, and methods of providing instruction in this area are underdeveloped); Engler, supra note 33,
at 144-49 (noting the difficulty in assessing cause and effect with respect to the report); Russell G.
Pearce, MacCrate’s Missed Opportunity: The MacCrate Report’s Failure to Advance Professional
Values, 23 PACE L. REV. 575 (2003).
38. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 35, at 235.
39. STATEMENT OF GOOD PRACTICES BY LAW PROFESSORS IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR
ETHICAL AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Ass’n of Am. Law Sch. 2003), available at
http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_sgp_eth.php [hereinafter AALS STATEMENT OF GOOD
PRACTICES]. The MacCrate Report also noted that “[l]aw school deans, professors, administrators and
staff must not only promote these values [of justice, fairness and morality] by words, but must so
conduct themselves as to convey to students that these values are essential ingredients of our
profession.” MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 35, at 236.
40. See, e.g., Wizner, supra note 22; Nina W. Tarr, Current Issues in Clinical Legal Education,
37 HOW. L.J. 31, 32-34 (1993). Despite clinical education’s historical focus on a social justice mission,
several commentators have articulated discomfort with situating responsibility for social justice
education exclusively within the bailiwick of clinics, arguing the reliance on clinics to address issues of
social justice permits the rest of the academy to abdicate their responsibility to address these concerns.
Many clinicians believe that law schools should embrace instruction pervasively, particularly with
respect to social justice, ethics and professionalism. See Engler, supra note 33, at 165. Integrating a
public service ethos into the core curriculum would create the perception of unified, institutional
support rather than relegating the social justice mission of law schools to the periphery of the skills
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MacCrate report engendered lively discourse about clinical education
within both clinical circles and the broader academy. In commemorating
the tenth anniversary of the MacCrate Report, Russell Engler exhorted
clinicians to renew reflection on the report and its aftermath, and assess
whether the design of clinical programs succeeds in “narrow[ing] the
gap.”41 Engler also urged clinicians to heed the report’s mandate to law
schools to “Pursue Equal Justice.”42 This sentiment is reinforced by other
academics echoing the call for law schools to shoulder some responsibility
for instilling concerns about equal access to justice.43 The recent
consolidation of clinical emphasis has been reflected in the development of
a body of distinctly clinical scholarship, which encourages clinicians to
revive the social justice mission of law schools through clinical
programming.44
B. CURRENT CRISIS IN ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Critical commentators lament this country’s failure to even remotely
approach the foundational and exalted concept of “equal justice under
law.”45 It is widely reported that only 20% of the legal needs of the poor
are satisfied.46 The American Bar Association conducted a study
determining that roughly three-fourths of the legal problems of the poor
were handled without any legal assistance.47 People of moderate means do
not fare much better, with studies estimating that our legal system excludes
meaningful participation for approximately 40-60% of middle-income
training curriculum. See id. at 168; see also Barry et al., supra note 17, at 15-16 (calling on each law
school course to raise issues of access to justice).
41. Engler, supra note 33, at 169.
42. See id.
43. See RHODE, supra note 4, at 193.
44. See EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 6, at 5.
45. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1785 (2001); see also
Robert Rubinson, A Theory of Access to Justice, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 104 (2005) (“Everyone—
lawyers, judges, academics, the public—knows that the ‘rich’ get more justice than everyone else.”).
46. See Rhode, supra note 45, at 1785. Another scholar notes:.
[T]here is about one lawyer for every 240 nonpoor Americans, but only one lawyer for every
9,000 Americans whose low income would qualify them for legal aid. Forty-five million
Americans qualify for civil legal aid, and they are served by a mere 4,000 legal-aid lawyers
plus an estimated 1,000 to 2,000 additional poor people’s lawyers. . . . In very real effect, lowincome Americans are denied access to justice.
Luban, supra note 15, at 211-12 (footnotes omitted).
47. See Albert H. Cantril, ABA, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL
JUSTICE—FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 5-6
(1996) [hereinafter AGENDA FOR ACCESS]. While the notion that pro se litigants are disadvantaged
when appearing in court seems manifest, it has also been analyzed empirically. See, e.g., Russell
Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers’ Negotiations with
Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79, 116 n.163 (1997); Wizner, supra note 30, at 328.
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individuals.48 As Deborah Rhode eloquently notes, “[i]t is a shameful
irony that the nation with the most lawyers has among the least adequate
systems for ensuring legal assistance. It is more shameful still that the
inadequacies attract so little concern.”49 The profound impact of this
shortage on the perceived legitimacy of representative democracy should
not be minimized,50 as “[s]ocial science research confirms what political
theorists have long argued: public confidence in legal processes depends
heavily on opportunities for direct participation.”51 For millions of
Americans, some legal assistance is the only way that they can participate
in adversarial, legislative and administrative processes. Access to legal
services helps prevent erroneous, unjust decisions and “affirms a respect
for human dignity and procedural fairness that are core democratic
ideals.”52
48. See AGENDA FOR ACCESS, supra note 47, at 4-9; see also RHODE, supra note 4, at 103;
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. ASS’N, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 18 (2006), available at
http://professionalism.law.sc.edu/news.html#CLEA [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES] (“Advice on topics
of daily importance in the lives of individuals, such as landlord/tenant law, child custody disputes, and
testamentary dispositions is priced beyond the reach of millions of working Americans. Equal Justice
Under the Law is an ideal whose pursuit is becoming increasingly futile.” (quoting Mary C. Daly, The
Structure of Legal Education and the Legal Profession, Multidisciplinary Practice, Competition, and
Globalization, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 480, 484 (2002))); John B. Attanasio, Out-of-the-Box Dialogs:
Foreword, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 473, 475 (2002) (“The academy has failed to train lawyers who provide
legal services to the middle and working classes, which, of course, constitute the overwhelming
majority of American society.”); Denise R. Johnson, The Legal Needs of the Poor as a Starting Point
for Systemic Reform, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 480-81 (1998).
49. Rhode, supra note 3, at 1013; see also Rubinson, supra note 45, at 156 (“It is astonishing that
the principle of equal justice—a principle enshrined in virtually every articulation and embodiment of
civic virtue and pride in our democracy, from courthouse facades, to the Pledge of Allegiance, to the
iconography of ‘blind justice’—remains so obviously and utterly hollow and illusory.”).
50. See Rubinson, supra note 45, at 90 (“[T]he ideal of equal justice is incompatible with the
social realities of unequal wealth, power, and opportunity, which no amount of legal formalism can
disguise. In an unequal society, the Haves usually are better served by legal formalism than the HaveNots, a disparity that creates a persistent legitimacy crisis.”).
51. Deborah L. Rhode, Cultures of Commitment: Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students, in
ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 266 (Deborah L. Rhode
ed., 2000). As Deborah Weissman notes:
The premium derived from opportunities to enforce legal rights may be categorized as a
public good that confers benefits on all members of society. But the celebration of legal
principles as the foundation of a democratic society must take particular measure of the
degree to which the poor and the powerless are included as beneficiaries. To deny the poor
access to the courts because of economic constraints would represent an egregious failure of
due process and a repudiation of democratic principles of civilized society.
Deborah M. Weissman, Law as Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 737, 749 (2002) (footnote omitted). However, there is also widespread misinformation obscuring
the extent of the problem. “Four-fifths of Americans believe, incorrectly, that the poor are entitled to
counsel in civil cases; only a third think that low-income individuals would have difficulty finding legal
assistance, a perception wildly out of touch with reality.” Rhode, supra note 3, at 1016.
52. Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 369, 376 (2004); see also EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that “issues of
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Although discourse surrounding inequitable access to justice is not
new, the current climate, replete with instances of retrenchment in policies,
has sparked a renewed sense of urgency. Commentators have identified a
number of contemporary developments that have adversely impacted the
ability of low-income persons to obtain legal services. Among the most
damaging were the widespread restrictions imposed by the Legal Services
Corporation (LSC)53 and fluctuations in its funding.54 Challenges to the
legitimacy of law school clinics that successfully advanced positions
contrary to powerful local interests also threaten to chill clinics that
effectively advocate for social justice.55 Additionally, restrictions on the

legal inequality profoundly affect the fabric of our democracy”). As a citizen, a lawyer should seek to
improve the law, the administration of justice and access to the legal system. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT pmbl. (2006). As a member of the legal profession,
[a] lawyer should be mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice and of the fact
that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal
assistance. Therefore, all lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic
influence to ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of
economic or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. A lawyer should
aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives . . . .
Id.
53. See Raymond H. Brescia et al., Who’s in Charge, Anyway? A Proposal for CommunityBased Legal Services, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 862 (1998) (“Recent funding cuts and restrictions
imposed on legal services programs have created a sense of profound crisis among legal services
staff.”). Legal services offices that receive federal funds are prohibited from using those federal funds,
and for some issues using funds from any other source, for a broad range of matters including school
desegregation, labor boycotts, abortion, political redistricting, military service, welfare reform,
undocumented aliens, prisoners and public housing tenants who face eviction due to alleged drug
activities. Rhode, supra note 52, at 379. Legal Services advocates are also proscribed from engaging in
activities such as lobbying, community organizing, or representation in legislative and administrative
rule-making proceedings. Id. As a result, many legal services offices split into different entities: those
who accepted LSC funds and were constrained by the restrictions, and those who eschewed LSC funds
in order to avail themselves of the full panoply of advocacy strategies. Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal
Assistance for the Twenty-First Century: Achieving Equal Justice for All, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
369, 369-70 (1998).
54. See Helaine M. Barnett, Justice for All: Are We Fulfilling the Pledge?, 41 IDAHO L. REV.
403, 413-16 (2005) (discussing the changes in LSC funding).
55. Potential interlopers included business leaders, legislatures, the local bar, university
administrations, alumni and donors. Robert Kuehn and Peter Joy recount a troubling history of
interference with law school clinical prerogatives, starting as early as the 1960s, and note that “[a]
recurring ethical issue is the propriety of politically, economically, or ideologically-motivated [sic]
efforts by persons and organizations outside the law school clinic to limit the clinic’s choice of clients
and cases.” Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, An Ethics Critique of Interference in Law School Clinics,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1971, 1975 (2003). They posit that with the notable exception of the Louisiana
Supreme Court, the judiciary has generally been protective of student/clinical prerogatives. Id. at 199192. Kuehn and Joy conclude by highlighting the important role law school clinics play in representing
unpopular or subordinated groups who may otherwise go unrepresented, and exhort law school clinics
to continue to resist interference. Id. at 2049-50.
In Louisiana, successful student advocacy in the Tulane Environmental Clinic ran afoul of the
interests of local businesses and the governor, and the Louisiana Supreme Court altered its student
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availability of attorneys’ fees for prevailing parties under fee shifting
provisions have also obstructed access to legal services.56 In the midst of a
string of defeats, beleaguered advocates for the poor have had some cause
for optimism. An attack on the Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Account
(IOLTA) system of legal services funding was defeated,57 and a campaign
to proscribe LSC funded legal services from challenging certain laws was

practice rules to obstruct the clinic’s ability to undertake any similar cases. See Robert R. Kuehn,
Denying Access to Legal Representation: The Attack on the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, 4
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 33 (2000). One alteration required strict enforcement of the student practice
rule’s indigency requirements, effectively making it difficult to represent a community organization
unless it could certify that a majority of the organization’s members fell within 200% of the federal
poverty guidelines. Id. at 91-92. According to one commentator, this requirement erected an
impediment to representing community groups, which are often comprised of members with varied
economic resources, all of whom may not satisfy rigid income requirements. See id. at 97 n.317.
Moreover, many groups decline to probe the finances of their members, concerned that economic
inquiries will deter membership. Id. at 98.
56. See Buckhannon Bd. & Home Care, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598 (2001). The Court curtailed the ability of lawyers to petition for attorneys’ fees as a prevailing
party under the catalyst theory, which in practice could allow defendants to enter a settlement
agreement on the eve of trial without incurring liability for attorneys’ fees. Id. at 609-10. Attorneys
still retain the right to negotiate for attorneys’ fees, but they are often waived in the interests of a better
settlement for the client. Although not a recent development, Luban points out the Court’s holding in
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), which, in essence, allows defendants to make “sacrifice offers”
conditioning settlement on opposing counsel’s willingness to waive attorneys’ fees. These offers place
attorneys in the difficult predicament of reconciling the potentially conflicting interests of maximizing
their clients’ financial recovery and their own economic survival. Luban, supra note 15, at 241-43.
57. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (upholding the legitimacy of IOLTA
funding). The Court noted that the appropriation of interest via IOLTA resulted in no pecuniary loss for
the plaintiffs, because the individual costs of administering the distribution of the interest would negate
any monies due, at least in cases where the amount deposited in the account is small and the duration is
short, and that the “public use” component of a regulatory taking is clearly satisfied. Id. As the Court
stated, “[i]n this case, the overall, dramatic success of IOLTA programs in serving the compelling
interest in providing legal services to literally millions of needy Americans qualifies the Foundation’s
distribution of the funds as a ‘public use.’” Id. at 217. The decision leaves the IOLTA program open to
a challenge by a party who could establish that they did suffer an uncompensated pecuniary loss, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that the plaintiffs
may have a valid “compelled speech” argument by asserting that they were forced to contribute to an
organization whose positions and functions they do not support, in violation of the First Amendment.
Id. at 253 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Luban points out the subtext and meaning of the compelled speech
argument. Luban, supra note 15, at 234-36. Because challengers to IOLTA cannot identify the direct
flow of the interest to which they allege they have been deprived, they cannot identify the exact nature
and subject matter of the representation they oppose. Id. at 235. Accordingly, their only argument must
be premised on the tenuous and inflammatory notion that “making them contribute to IOLTA interest
compels clients to fund speech that they abhor [and] is tantamount to saying that they abhor anything
that anyone might say on behalf of a poor person.” Id. Despite this victory, other potential challenges
to the long-term viability of relying on IOLTA to fund legal services programs remain. See Tarra L.
Morris, The Dog in the Manger: The First Twenty-Five Years of War on IOLTA, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
605 (2005).
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overturned as impermissible “viewpoint discrimination.”58 Despite these
victories, the ominous trend toward the decreased ability of poor and
subordinated communities to avail themselves of legal remedies demands a
coordinated response that ensures that access to justice does not erode
further.
C. INTERPLAY BETWEEN CLINICAL EDUCATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
IMPERATIVES
The current political and economic climate’s stark impact on our
nation’s poor compels law schools to prioritize attention to social justice
issues. Incorporating social justice goals into clinical programming serves
this mandate in multiple ways, including providing relief, however
minimal, to underserved poor members of local legal communities,
instilling values of public service in students, and exposing students to the
lack of access to lawyers and the court systems, which creates an
impediment to equal justice. 59 As the institutions vested with a monopoly
in providing legal training, law schools must pervasively embrace their role
in heightening awareness of unequal justice and cultivating an individual
moral imperative to respond to this crisis.60

58. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001) (striking down a provision
restricting LSC attorneys from advancing legal strategies which included an attempt to amend or
challenge current welfare statutes, premised on the notion that the restriction was “designed to insulate
the Government’s interpretation of the Constitution from judicial challenge”). The Court found that an
independent judiciary relies on the ability of attorneys to fully present their arguments and concurred
that the restrictions engendered “lingering doubt” about the fundamental fairness of limiting LSC
attorneys to “truncated representation.” Id. at 546.
59. See Wizner & Aiken, supra note 4, at 1011.
In order to increase the number of law school graduates who embrace a professional
responsibility to assure access to justice for the poor, clinicians must strive to inculcate in
their students an understanding and compassionate concern for the plight of people living in
poverty, and a sense of professional responsibility for increasing their access to justice.
Id.
60. A 1997 AALS survey of law school deans revealed that ninety-five percent concurred that “it
is an important goal of law schools to instill in students a sense of obligation to perform pro bono work
during their later careers.” COMM’N ON PRO BONO & PUB. SERV. OPPORTUNITIES, ASS’N OF AM. LAW
SCH., LEARNING TO SERVE, http://www.aals.org/probono/report2.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006); see
also Steven H. Hobbs, Shout from Taller Rooftops: A Response to Deborah L. Rhode’s Access to
Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 935 (2004) (noting that Rhode “calls upon law schools to plant,
fertilize, and water the seeds of pro bono service in the hearts and minds of law students as they pursue
their legal education”); Robert R. Kuehn, A Normative Analysis of the Rights and Duties of Law
Professors to Speak Out, 55 S.C. L. REV. 253, 293 (2003) (“[T]he issue is not whether law schools
should seek to instill the legal profession’s public service norms, but rather, how this should best be
done.”); EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 6, at 3 (“[L]aw schools have a vital role to play in
explicating the nature of the problems and generating approaches for their resolution.”).
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In 1999, grave concerns about the inadequate access to legal services
that plagues low-income individuals spurred the American Association of
Law Schools to launch the Equal Justice Project (“the Project”) aimed at
confronting “the severe maldistribution of legal resources adversely
affecting people and communities faced with immediate legal issues.”61
The Project was “borne of the conviction that law schools have a special
responsibility to promote equality in the legal system and meaningful
access to law and lawyers,” 62 a trend that mirrors the general belief that
universities should direct at least some of their resources toward promoting
justice. In locating law schools at the center of this crisis, the Project
opined that the implications of this disparity reach far beyond the
individuals themselves, as “issues of legal inequality profoundly affect the
fabric of our democracy.”63 The Project advanced the position that law
schools,64 the judiciary, the bar and the broader community must work
together to illuminate the depth and range of the problem and to explore
and implement strategies to address the inequalities.65 The imprimatur of
the Association of American Law Schools should motivate law schools to
experiment with pioneering strategies to address the crisis of great

61. EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 6, at 1.
62. Id. at 5; see also RHODE, supra note 4, at 193. The Equal Justice Project calls for education
about access to justice, both among lawyers and the general public. See EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT,
supra note 6, at 3.
63. EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 6, at 3.
64. See Tigran W. Eldred & Thomas Schoenherr, The Lawyer’s Duty of Public Service: More
Than Charity?, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 367, 400 (1994) (asserting that “‘law schools . . . constitute the
greatest opportunity’ to instill an ethic of public service in young lawyers” (quoting the ABA
Commission on Professionalism)). Eldred & Schoenherr recommend that law schools expose students
to the lack of any structural guarantee of access to the legal system for the poor, noting that such
exposure should be taught pervasively throughout the curriculum, rather than isolated in professional
ethics courses. See id. at 400-01. They encourage law schools to provide a mix of doctrinal and
clinical opportunities that address issues of poverty and justice while combating the perception that
public interest work is less worthy or less prestigious than corporate work. Id. at 401-02; see also
Kristin Booth Glen, Pro Bono and Public Interest Opportunities in Legal Education, N.Y. ST. B.J.,
May–June 1998, at 20, 20 (noting that law schools should capitalize on the time they have to influence
student mores by providing service opportunities that arouse a public interest commitment, exposing
students to disadvantaged persons and fulfilling unmet legal needs).
65. EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 6, at 3. Obligations to practice in the public interest
extend beyond those employed as “public interest lawyers,” and the private bar has played an increasing
role in this effort. See Stuart Scheingold, The Struggle to Politicize Legal Practice: A Case Study of
Left-Activist Lawyering in Seattle, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 118 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); Louise G.
Trubek, The Worst of Times . . . and the Best of Times: Lawyering for Poor Clients Today, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1123 (1995); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 cmt. (2006),
(“Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a responsibility to
provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the
disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer.”).
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disparities in access to justice. Moreover, it may encourage law schools to
recognize and reward scholarship that analyzes and addresses a
comprehensive, informed response to these inequities.66
Clinical education is an ideal vehicle to promote a social justice
mission.67 First, “social justice is furthered through the provision of
services and pursuit of legal and social reform on behalf of clients and
community groups lacking meaningful access to society’s institutions of
justice and power.”68 Second, students inculcated with a sense of civic
responsibility in law school have a greater propensity to provide pro bono
services or select public interest jobs after graduation.69
Third,
participation in clinics “facilitat[es] transformative experiential
opportunities for exploring the meaning of justice and developing a
personal sense of justice, through exposure to the impact of the legal
system on subordinated persons and groups and through the deconstruction
of power and privilege in law.”70 Fran Quigley characterizes a clinic
student’s exposure to the life circumstances of their clients as a
“disorienting moment,” impossible to replicate in all its complexity in a
classroom setting focused on doctrinal analysis, but a necessary precursor
to meaningful learning, particularly about social justice issues.71 Fourth,
clinical education provides a necessary counterbalance to the still dominant
Langdellian method of instruction, which “ignores the impact of social and
political factors on law and therefore presents a picture of the legal system
and lawyers’ place in it that is, at best, hopelessly naive, and at worst,
dangerously misleading.”72 Finally, a carefully constructed clinical

66. The Equal Justice Project notes that law faculty are evaluated on scholarship, service, and
teaching, but these criteria are not accorded equal value. EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 6, at 6.
“Rigid definitions of countable scholarship have often inhibited faculty, usually at the pre-tenure stage,
from conducting research on controversial, contested or political issues or linking their research to the
activities of grassroots groups.” Id. Moreover, it is widely perceived that service is devalued in faculty
performance evaluations. Id. Finally, “[e]xcellence in teaching is universally valued, but the
standardized approaches to evaluation of teaching rarely include the extraordinary demands of teaching
advocacy-based or community-centered courses.” Id. These impediments led the report to conclude
that “inhibitors to faculty (and student) involvement in equal justice work pose tangible disincentives
for faculty members who desire to link theory, passion, and values with useful action.” Id.
67. Wizner, supra note 22, at 1929-30.
68. Dubin, supra note 8, at 1475.
69. Id. at 1476.
70. Id. at 1477.
71. See Fran Quigley, Seizing the Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the
Teaching of Social Justice in Law School Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37 (1995).
72. Id. at 39; see also Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning
Environment in Law School, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 79 (2002) (noting the “psychological distress,
dissatisfaction, and substance abuse” brought about by the Langdellian method and suggesting that
these effects may be mitigated by courses that focus on morality and social justice).
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experience can serve as a catalyst for students to observe more generally
“the many subtle and unsubtle ways in which invidious discrimination
permeates our legal system.”73
Law schools should strive to “create a subculture that sustains students
in the pursuit of public interest career goals.”74 Many students enter the
academy brimming with optimism and energy to engage in public interest
work. All too often, however, students who enter law school with altruistic
goals and idealistic visions of the law as an effective and powerful tool for
social change embark on their careers having forsaken their idealism and
commitment to social justice issues.75 Incorporating social justice
imperatives into both clinical and doctrinal pedagogy may serve to
ameliorate the erosion of commitment to public interest work that students
often experience during and after law school. Analysts speculate that a
number of factors contribute to the widespread desertion of lofty goals that
brought many to law school in the first place.76 Many doctrinal classes are
73. Jon C. Dubin, Faculty Diversity as a Clinical Legal Education Imperative, 51 HASTINGS L.J.
445, 464 (2000) (noting that faculty diversity within clinical legal education is woefully inadequate).
74. See Howard S. Erlanger & Gabrielle Lessard, Mobilizing Law Schools in Response to
Poverty: A Report on Experiments in Progress, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 199, 225 (1993). Law schools
should also facilitate, nurture and encourage student interest in engaging in public interest work in ways
outside of clinical education. See Engler, supra note 33, at 164-165. The Equal Justice Project
recommends that law schools encourage collaborative efforts among career placement offices, pro bono
coordinators and faculty to inform students about career options that “expand access to justice.” EQUAL
JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 6, at 37. This type of alliance would contribute to the perception of
institutional support for equal justice work. See Kotkin, supra note 32, at 129 (noting that law school
training “may ‘create a schism between a student’s belief in social change and the use of his or her legal
career to bring about such change’” (quoting Jill Chaifetz, The Value of Public Service: A Model for
Instilling a Pro Bono Ethic in Law School, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1701 (1993)).
75. Many theorists have posited explanations of the shift away from public interest commitment,
although little methodical analysis has been conducted. Further study into the atrophy of public interest
commitment is clearly necessary to identify the causes with certainty. In the interim, however, we can
give some credence to hypotheses based on anecdotal information, and attempt to create strategies to
remedy the problem. See Henry Rose, Law Schools Should Be About Justice Too, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
443 (1992). Rose cites Erlanger and Stover, who attribute this decline to a number of factors, including
“lack of emphasis . . . on social justice issues and the general devaluation of these concerns by law
school teachers,” students’ reaction to the stress of first year law school in which survival is paramount,
a lack of peer support for social justice issues, trepidation about inadequate compensation and a lack of
loan forgiveness programs, and general concern about job satisfaction in public interest work. Id. at
445 (citing ROBERT V. STOVER, MAKING IT AND BREAKING IT: THE FATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST
COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL (Howard S. Erlanger ed., 1989)).
76. See Sally Maresh, The Impact of Clinical Legal Education on Decisions of Law Students to
Practice Public Interest Law, in EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL VALUES AND LEGAL EDUCATION,
supra note 19, at 154. Maresh conducted a small empirical study to ascertain whether participation in a
clinical program impacted a student’s perception of and commitment to public interest work. Id. at
159-64. Though limited in sample size, she determined that for those predisposed to public interest
work, participation in a clinic had little impact on that commitment—96% retained their commitment.
Id. at 163. In contrast, for 57% of those with no predisposition to public interest work, participation in a
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structured to inculcate the notion that the practice of law requires logical
and dispassionate analysis applied to concrete predetermined facts,
insulated from the social, historical and political context in which the cases
are decided. However, law does not occur in a sanitized vacuum, and law
schools do their students a disservice by requiring them to completely
dissociate their sense of justice and fair play from their legal persona,77 a
practice encouraged by privileging and valuing a purely analytical
perspective.78 As one commentator notes, “[t]his risk is especially great if
professors are training students to ‘think like a lawyer’ as if legal decisionmaking is autonomous and without moral context.”79 This methodology
imparts a monochromatic and depersonalized view of law and the people it
impacts, removed from the facts and details that color real-world people
with concrete, intractable problems.80 A well-structured clinical experience
clinic did more favorably dispose them to consider public interest practice. Id. When queried as to
what factors influenced their decision, they cited
a ‘personalization’ of the plight of the poor, a realization that many of their clients needed
representation through not fault of their own, a recognition that the integrity of the judicial
system is dependent on equal access to representation regardless of individual resources, and
that the ‘right’ to counsel is not an inalienable right.
Id. at 164. While no longitudinal data were available to determine whether the attitudinal shift endured
or actually influenced career choice or the ongoing provision of pro bono services, the results confirm
that there is the potential for clinical experiences to have a profound impact. See id.; see also Erlanger
& Lessard, supra note 74, at 225 (positing that although it is too soon to assess whether participants’
experience in the Interuniversity Consortium’s Project Group resulted in an abiding commitment to
public interest work, participants “did report or demonstrate that their experiences affected their
thinking about poverty and the legal system”).
77. See Calmore, supra note 3, at 631 (enumerating fifteen structural impediments that “hamper
students in developing a legal persona that reflects social justice lawyering,” including “legal education
itself”); see also Jane Aiken & Stephen Wizner, Law as Social Work, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 73
(2003) (noting that law students encounter a “curriculum [that] is designed to neutralize . . . passion by
imposing a rigor of thought that divorces law students from their feelings and morality,” in contrast to
the progressive curricula preferred by many social work programs).
78. See Hess, supra note 72, at 78-79 (noting that students are instructed “that tough-minded
analysis, hard facts, and cold logic are the tools of a good lawyer, and it has little room for emotion,
imagination, and morality. For some students, ‘learning to think like a lawyer’ means abandoning their
ideals, ethical values, and sense of self.”). A number of recent studies demonstrate the link between law
school training and a decline in law student wellbeing. See Lawrence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of
Professionalism and Personal Satisfaction: Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, 11
CLINICAL L. REV. 425 (2005) [hereinafter Krieger, Inseparability]; Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional
Denial About the Dark Side of Law School, and Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking
the Silence, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 112 (2002) [hereinafter Krieger, Institutional Denial]; see also Ann L.
Iijima, Lessons Learned: Legal Education and Law Student Dysfunction, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 524, 538
(1998) (noting that students suffer when they are required to sacrifice personal values on the “altar of
rationalism”).
79. Marjorie L. Girth, Facing Ethical Issues with Law Students in an Adversary Context, 21 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 593, 599 (2005).
80. See Adrienne Stone, Women, Law School and Student Commitment to the Public Interest, in
EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL VALUES AND LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 19, at 56. Stone
explored the correlation between some women’s characterization of their experience at law school as
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can keep students impassioned and engaged throughout law school,
fostering a commitment to public service. Moreover, interaction with
clients can shatter archetypal images of the poor.81 Clinical Education is
the best method for teaching the skills and values that lead to effective
lawyering for social justice. 82 The benefits inure both professionally and
personally, as “many individual lawyers have much to gain . . . from
greater involvement with issues of social justice. Public interest and pro
bono service can enhance skills, contacts, reputation, and psychological
well-being.”83
A variety of objectives coexist under the big tent of clinical
pedagogy.84 Law schools and individual clinicians have broad latitude to
develop an overarching clinical vision by prioritizing from among those
legitimate pedagogical goals, including which lawyering skills and values
to emphasize, as well as the substantive focus of the programs. As the
above discussion makes clear, a law school’s clinic programming should
devote at least some of its faculty resources and pedagogical focus to
ensuring that access to justice and broader social justice concerns are more
than just hollow aspirations. This mandate includes attention to providing
services to marginalized communities, addressing the issue of unmet legal
dehumanizing and devoid of emotional content and context, id. at 70, with the “fate of public interest
commitment at law school.” Id. at 56. She concludes that while other factors may influence student
commitment to public interest work, it is imperative that we recognize and address the transformative
nature of legal education and affirm the values students embrace prior to law school, rather than
extinguish them. See id. at 59; see also Jeremy Cooper & Louise G. Trubek, Social Values from Law
School to Practice: An Introductory Essay, in EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE: SOCIAL VALUES AND LEGAL
EDUCATION, supra note 19, at 1, 14 (“A law school . . . can too easily destroy the potential desire of law
students to commit themselves passionately and wholeheartedly to social justice, by its obsession with
the acontextual, the dispassionate, and the analytical.”). Additionally, the students’ lack of exposure to
and engagement with social justice issues is compounded by the burdens of unprecedented educational
debt, leaving many students unable to opt for a low-paying career that does not permit them to service
their loans. See EQUAL JUSTICE WORKS ET AL., FROM PAPER CHASE TO MONEY CHASE: LAW SCHOOL
DEBT
DIVERTS
ROAD
TO
PUBLIC
SERVICE
6
(2002),
available
at
http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/choose/lrapsurvey.pdf (“Faced with staggering law school debt,
many law school graduates must forgo the call to public service despite their interest and commitment
to such a career.”).
81. The stereotype of a generic “welfare queen” may be most effectively countered by exposure
to a real, live, struggling, complicated client. See Abbe Smith, For Tom Joad and Tom Robinson: The
Moral Obligation to Defend the Poor, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 869, 878 (1997) (“The law school
clinic provides the best opportunity for law students to connect with those in need . . . .”).
82. There are barriers to the success of clinics in achieving this goal, as not all students enroll in
clinics, and “clinical faculty are often accorded lesser status in the law school hierarchy, thus conveying
a negative message about the value of public service work.” Kotkin, supra note 32, at 130.
83. Rhode, supra note 3, at 1023; see also Donald Patrick Harris, Let’s Make Lawyers Happy:
Advocating Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 287 (1999) (arguing that public service work
can serve as an antidote to lawyer dissatisfaction).
84. See Engler, supra note 33, at 150-51.
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needs and inculcating a sense of professional responsibility. While these
goals may suggest different trade-offs, the choices require thoughtful
consideration.
II. PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING THEORIES
Evaluating a law school clinical program’s success in articulating and
pursuing a social justice mission requires familiarity with some recent
theoretical developments related to lawyering for justice.
The
underpinnings of progressive lawyering have evolved as the clinical
education movement has matured. Although there is not complete accord
as to the goals and methodology of social justice lawyering, a few trends
are worthy of brief recitation. As with most issues, reducing the discussion
to a few pages necessarily obscures the complexity, depth, scope and
nuance of the issues. While this discussion is admittedly facile, it is
intended primarily to provide the context for the critique of the clinic.
The section starts by establishing a working definition of social justice
lawyering for the purposes of the clinic critique. Next, this section briefly
discusses some of the limitations advocates encounter when they rely
exclusively on rights-based approaches to advance social justice, and
identifies advocacy efforts that encompass a broader set of strategies. This
section concludes by discussing the widespread censure of the potentially
disempowering nature of the attorney-client relationship that can run afoul
of client empowerment and social justice strategies.85 Much of the
discussion about the relational dynamic between lawyers and clients is
inextricably related to the criticism of the rights-based strategies in Section
B, infra. The synthesis of these criticisms has propelled a movement
toward a more inclusive, egalitarian, comprehensive community-based
model of lawyering for social justice. The critique of Anti-Discrimination
Clinic’s ability to meet social justice goals in the next section is premised
in part on the above-noted considerations.
A. DEFINING SOCIAL JUSTICE LAWYERING
The terms public interest lawyering and social justice lawyering are
often used interchangeably. While there is indeed overlap between them,
both terms evade easy definition and consensus.86 Rather than draw an
85. Often, the criticism of lawyering efforts incorporates both strategic and relational concerns.
For ease of presentation, I place the criticism in the section that best fits its focus.
86. See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of
Professional Authority, Introduction to CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 65, at 3, 5.
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artificial or normative line between public interest and social justice
lawyering, or wade into the debate about what type of lawyering qualifies
for these labels, I prefer to characterize them as occupying different places
on the continuum of lawyering for the public good. Ultimately, “[w]hether
the pursuit of any particular cause advances the public interest is very much
in the eye of the beholder.”87 While it is not my intent to characterize an
inclusive definition of public interest work pejoratively, some argue that:
While fine work for social justice continues to take place through public
interest law firms and public interest organizations, the broad term
“public interest law” no longer fully captures either the commitment to
work on behalf of marginalized, subordinated, and underrepresented
clients and communities or the value placed on transformation that
characterizes lawyering for social justice.88

For purposes of clarity and simplicity, this article will rely Louise
Trubek’s definition of “critical lawyering,” which she described as a
strategy that “aims to provide subordinated groups with greater access to
legal representation [to] . . . better promote social change.”89 Simply put,
for purposes of this analysis, “social justice lawyering” is premised on the
commitment to work for marginalized clients.90 This characterization
envisions an agenda that addresses both procedural justice and more

87. STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS,
PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 5 (2004).
88. MARTHA R. MAHONEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS,
COMMUNITIES, AND LAW 4-5 (2003).
89. Louise Trubek & M. Elizabeth Kransberger, Critical Lawyers: Social Justice and the
Structures of Private Practice, in CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 65, at 201, 203. Alternative labels
include rebellious lawyering, equal justice lawyering, activist lawyering, critical lawyering, political
lawyering and visionary lawyering. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward
an Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING,
supra note 65, at 31, 33. These generic definitions differ from “cause-specific” labels that denote a
particular substantive area of practice, such as legal services, death penalty and environmental work.
Id. For a more thorough discussion of the difficulties in defining social justice lawyering, or “cause
lawyering,” see id. See also SCHEINGOLD & SARAT, supra note 87, at 3, in which the authors note that
the definitional and conceptual underpinnings of cause lawyering are dependent on intent and culturespecific variables that are dynamic and disputed.
90. Compare Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087, 2108-09
(2004) (discussing a definition of public interest lawyering based on low remuneration and noting the
“legal profession’s habit of equating public interest with financial sacrifice”), with Susan D. Carle, ReValuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 719, 730-31 (2001) (arguing that
public interest work is characterized by lawyering on behalf of under-represented constituencies).
Some now contend that there has been an “increasingly overinclusive label of ‘public interest law.’ . . .
[C]onservative and reactionary advocates have effectively rearticulated and redeployed the term ‘public
interest.’” John O. Calmore, “Chasing the Wind”: Pursuing Social Justice, Overcoming Legal MisEducation, and Engaging in Professional Re-Socialization, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1167, 1169 (2004)
[hereinafter Calmore, Chasing the Wind].
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ambitiously, substantive justice. The goal of procedural justice, defined
loosely as the access to representation and courts that is integral to a fully
functioning adversarial system, seems unlikely to generate significant
discord. 91 Defining matters of substantive justice is a far more perilous
enterprise. In its most radical form, demands for true substantive justice
could be perceived to require disassembling the existing power structure in
order to precipitate a redistribution of resources.92 While I do not intend to
critique the clinic’s ability to completely overhaul all of society’s structural
inequities, I believe the social justice goals of a clinic should incorporate
more than just technical access to the legal system. Moreover, sensitizing
students to issues of equal justice is a critical element of encouraging social
justice work.
Accordingly, a clinical program should embrace a
commitment to serve marginalized clients and simultaneously heighten
student awareness about issues of equal justice.
B. LIMITATIONS OF STRATEGIES BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON LEGAL
REMEDIES
Advocates have long analyzed and debated the most effective methods
of achieving enduring, systematic relief for poor and subordinated clients
and communities. Among the most prominent concerns articulated by
progressive lawyers has been the disappointing results of law reform and
social justice efforts that were premised exclusively on the rights-based
approach of combining impact litigation and individual representation.93
Many advocates concede that a reform strategy based exclusively, or even
primarily, on litigation will ultimately be ineffectual in achieving enduring

91. See, e.g., Calmore, Chasing the Wind, supra note 90.
92. Id. at 1175 (“[W]e must always keep our eyes on the prize of improving material conditions,
dismantling structural inequality, disrupting systemic oppressions, and redistributing wealth. We must
create more egalitarian institutions and we must erode illegitimately held privilege.”).
93. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 5 (2d ed., The Univ. of Mich. Press 2004) (1974) (“Legal frames of reference
tunnel the vision of both activists and analysts leading to an oversimplified approach to a complex
social process—an approach that grossly exaggerates the role that lawyers and litigation can play in a
strategy for change.”); Richard Abel, Big Lies and Small Steps: A Critique of Deborah Rhode’s Too
Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1019,
1024 (1998) (asserting that rights-based strategies cannot address structural inequalities); Jennifer
Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle
for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995); Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering:
Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67 (2000) (encouraging lawyers to
expand strategies beyond rights-based approaches and adopt a community-based response); Kenneth W.
Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256,
259-60 (2005).
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social change.94 “The consensus . . . seems to be that the role of litigation
and the courts is very limited in producing meaningful social change but
that [it] can play an essential part in the overall strategy of the social
change agenda.”95 Reflective advocates recognize the importance of
methodically and meticulously analyzing how progressive lawyers can
enact meaningful reform.
Historical failures have prompted lawyers to develop and experiment
with new strategies aimed at achieving social change. Premised in part on
empirical evidence demonstrating that representation in individual and
impact cases was insufficient to effect widespread reform, many poverty
lawyers now advocate a revised strategy that “take[s] on the task of
securing systemic and institutional changes that would alleviate poverty
itself.”96 New strategies include multidisciplinary problem-solving,
community economic development work, law and organizing, therapeutic
jurisprudence and a shift toward a human rights framework.97 Their
94. Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to
Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 537 (1988) (“In this changed climate, where litigation
no longer consistently produces systemic reform, poor people’s advocates must be creative and flexible
in responding to their clients’ needs.”); see also FRANCIS FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR
PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL (1977) (arguing that litigation should
be used as a mechanism to inspire and mobilize the constituencies it endeavors to empower).
95. Jeff Streiffer, If You Can’t Get There from Here, Then That’s Not Where You Need to Go:
Epistemological Priority, Cultural Action, and Lawyering for Social Change, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 397, 399 n.8 (1997).
96. Stephen Loffredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes from a Law School Clinic,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 178 (2001).
97. For further information on multi-disciplinary problem-solving, see, for example, V. Pualani
Enos & Lois H. Kanter, Who’s Listening? Introducing Students to Client-Centered, Client-Empowering,
and Multidisciplinary Problem-Solving in a Clinical Setting, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 83 (2002) (describing
a multidisciplinary approach to domestic violence at Boston Medical Center’s Domestic Violence
Project); Louise G. Trubek & Jennifer J. Farnham, Social Justice Collaboratives: Multidisciplinary
Practices for People, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 227 (2000). For a discussion of community economic
development work, see Scott Cummings, Community Economic Development and the Legacy of Brown
v. Board of Education, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 443, 443 (2004)
(“[W]hereas the civil rights paradigm sought legal change through the medium of the courts, CED
eschews courts altogether and seeks instead to facilitate community-based transactions designed to
promote economic and political empowerment.”); Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic
Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 399 (2001) [hereinafter Cummings, Progressive Politics]; Laurie A. Morin, Legal Services
Attorneys as Partners in Community Economic Development: Creating Wealth for Poor Communities
Through Cooperative Economics, 5 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 125 (2000); Susan R. Jones, Small Business
and Community Economic Development: Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and Economic
Justice, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 195, 207 (1997); Peter Pitegoff, Law School Initiatives in Housing and
Community Development, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 275, 276-82 (1995); Daniel S. Shah, Lawyering for
Empowerment: Community Development and Social Change, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 217 (1999). For
additional information on law and organizing, see Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical
Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001). Lastly, for further discussion of the
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relevance to the critique of the law school’s clinical program requires brief
discussion of the first four approaches.
Recognizing that many problems faced by poor and marginalized
client communities extend far beyond a discrete legal problem amenable to
a purely legal solution, many advocates are developing approaches that
include multidisciplinary problem-solving:
Newer lawyering models, which shift the focus from vindication
of legal rights and injuries to creative problem solving, stress the
need to transcend doctrinal areas, legal fora, and professional
disciplines to fully address client problems. In increasing
numbers, lawyers in both public interest and private practice
settings are working collaboratively or cooperatively with
professionals in other disciplines to address client problems in a
more holistic, efficient, comprehensive, and cost-effective
fashion.98
Multidisciplinary approaches bring together professionals with
expertise in various areas to avoid isolating legal problems and lawyers
from their broader context. This comprehensive approach to problemsolving endeavors to generate meaningful solutions to problems that cannot
be solved by legal remedies alone.
Community Economic Development (CED) has also emerged as a
means to alleviate poverty and empower marginalized communities. CED
is based on the organizing principle that economic development is a
necessary precursor to a comprehensive solution to poverty.99 The CED
model aspires to lift neighborhoods out of poverty by encouraging
development through ventures in economically disadvantaged
neighborhoods, with initiatives that solicit broad support from a diverse
coalition of groups. This model promotes the alternative economic vision
that “focus[es] on enlisting the political power of community-based

shift to a human rights framework, see, for example, Leti Volpp, Righting Wrongs, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1815, 1833-36 (2000) (noting that lawyers are increasingly focusing on international human rights
standards); Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of International Human
Rights Clinics, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 505, 509 (2003) (“[H]uman rights lawyering can be considered the
twenty-first century’s manifestation of the original social justice mission of clinical legal education.”).
98. Barry et al., supra note 17, at 65-66 (footnotes omitted).
99. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT 2-3
(2001) (defining the integral components of CED as “(1) efforts to develop housing, jobs, or business
opportunities for low-income people, (2) in which a leading role is played by nonprofit,
nongovernmental organizations (3) that are accountable to residentially defined communities”).
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coalitions of residents, labor union members, clergy, and other activists to
challenge economic inequality and corporate dominance.”100
The critical appraisal of law reform efforts in the early 1990s also
triggered a revitalized progressive model that underscores the importance
of fusing grassroots community involvement with legal advocacy.101
Adherents of “law and organizing” stress the need to concentrate on
cultivating broad-based social movements as integral to meaningful and
enduring social change. Implicit in the structure of these social change
organizations is that they are democratically run and scrupulously avoid
privileging lawyering tasks above other efforts at mobilization.102 In fact,
for some theorists, “lawyers are ancillary to the definition and
implementation of a transformative agenda.”103 Many exalt the law and
organizing model as an ideal fusion of contemporary progressive lawyering
models and social movement theory aimed at combating the pervasive and
intractable nature of social and economic injustice.104
Another frequently articulated criticism of litigation-based strategies is
that they fail to identify, acknowledge and attend to the emotional needs of
clients. A response to those concerns is reflected in the relatively new field
of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, which exhorts lawyers to be mindful of the
emotional and psychological consequences of a client’s interactions with
the law and legal system. Therapeutic Jurisprudence is just one of a variety
of approaches to lawyering which “seek to broaden traditional conceptions
100. Cummings, Progressive Politics, supra note 97, at 405. “Under this new approach, CED is
reconceptualized as a progressive political strategy that fuses legal advocacy and grassroots organizing
to achieve broad-based economic reform.” Id. at 408; see also Morin, supra note 97, at 130-31.
101. Community organizing is obviously not a new concept. Saul Alinsky pioneered community
organizing as a strategy in the 1930s. See SAUL D. ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS (1946); SAUL
D. ALINSKY, RULES FOR RADICALS: A PRAGMATIC PRIMER FOR REALISTIC RADICALS (1971). As
proponents of community organizing efforts have more recently noted:
Legal services programs can improve the quality of their service by establishing communitybased programs which emphasize closer links with community groups and community
institutions. By moving in this direction, legal services programs will be better situated to
mobilize community resources and reflect community priorities. A community-based
program will avoid the top-down, lawyer-dominated priorities that we believe now exist.
Brescia et al., supra note 53, at 832. For other commentaries calling for the expansion of strategies to
ameliorate poverty see, for example, Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (1984); Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L. J.
1049 (1970).
102. See Cummings & Eagly, supra note 97, at 467 (stating that lawyers should also use
“organizing techniques” to empower client communities, instead of relying solely on lawyering skills).
103. Id. at 447.
104. Another proponent of law and organizing is Stephen Loffredo, who chronicled the efforts of
the City University of New York and the Welfare Rights Initiative to craft a “purposefully structured,
mutually reinforcing interaction between legal advocacy, law reform, and grassroots activism in the
poverty context.” Loffredo, supra note 96, at 177.
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of the legal profession by adding an interdisciplinary, psychologically
oriented paradigm that concerns itself with client needs and emotional
well-being as well as rights.”105
In collaboration with partners from other disciplines and members of
the communities in which they work, progressive lawyers are
experimenting with a variety of innovative approaches aimed at achieving
equal justice. These strategies should inform clinical pedagogy when
social justice lawyering is an explicit goal.
C. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT DYNAMIC
The emergence of theories extolling explicitly political-activist
lawyering often combines the goals of providing access to justice and
meaningful social change with attention to ensuring that clients are not
subordinated by the dynamics of the attorney-client relationship. The last
few decades have witnessed the proliferation of “extensive literature
stressing the importance of a more egalitarian collaboration between
attorneys and lower-income clients.”106 The genesis of this self-reflection
was sparked by post-modern critics who turned their attention to the
methodology of poverty lawyers, scrutinizing the disempowering
interpersonal dynamics of the attorney-client relationship and the broader
social context in which lawyers practice.107 Under a more egalitarian
paradigm, an activist lawyer “not only interacts with the client on a nonhierarchical basis, but also participates with the client in the planning and
implementation of strategies that are designed to build power for the client
and allow the client to be a repeat player at the political bargaining
table.”108
The conception and behavior of lawyers as domineering experts has
been frequently assailed. The first critics who received widespread acclaim
105. Bruce J. Winick, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Teaching Lawyering Skills: Meeting
the Challenge of the New ABA Standards, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 429, 433 (2005). Other approaches
include Holistic Lawyering, Collaborative Lawyering, Preventive Law, Restorative Justice, Creative
Problem-Solving, Transformative Mediation and Problem-Solving Courts. See id.; see also Keri K.
Gould & Michael L. Perlin, “Johnny’s in the Basement/Mixing Up His Medicine”: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Clinical Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339 (2000); Mary Berkheiser, Frasier
Meets CLEA: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Law School Clinics, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1147
(1999).
106. Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427, 432
(2000).
107. Cummings & Eagly, supra note 97, at 456-58.
108. Diamond, supra note 93, at 109; see also Cummings & Eagly, supra note 97, at 469
(discussing how law and organizing “foster[s] client empowerment and achieve[s] important client
victories”).
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were Binder and Price (later Binder, Price and Bergman), who proposed
client-centered counseling as an alternative relational dynamic in 1977.109
Their perspective revolutionized the way some lawyers conceptualize and
structure their client interactions.110 Binder et al. emphasized the primacy
of client empowerment and autonomy, criticizing the traditional model of
attorney-client interaction as oppressive. They argued that decisionmaking, both as to the goal of representation and the method by which it is
achieved, should devolve to the client. 111 The model of client-centered
lawyering resonates partially because it is the clients who live with the
outcome of strategic and substantive choices and, as such, they should be
vested with the power to make those decisions. Moreover, from a
philosophical standpoint, it is critical to reject attorney paternalism and
domination. 112 Aside from the lofty ideals of client autonomy, clients have
much to contribute to the case, as they are most intimately familiar with the
circumstances and context in which the problem arises.113
In rallying attorneys to challenge the traditional model of attorney
omnipotence and client subordination, Gerald Lopez championed
“rebellious lawyering.” Lopez encouraged lawyers to discard the model of
lawyering he characterizes as “regnant” and adopt a more empowering
dynamic that encompasses a community-based approach to reform.114

109. See DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977).
110. See, e.g., Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REV. 697 (1992)
(reviewing DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH
(1991); ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING AND
NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION (1990)).
111. Piomelli, supra note 106, at 437 (“[The client-centered model] urged lawyers to hone their
interpersonal skills, recognize the non-legal (especially emotional) dimensions of legal problems, and
give clients the necessary information and power to make informed choices on significant decisions.”).
Piomelli notes that this model presupposes advocacy in the context of cases. See id. at 438.
112. Some critics contend that the Binder model goes too far in avoiding lawyer paternalism and
dominance by exhorting lawyers to refrain from giving advice, lest they exert undue influence over
vulnerable and impressionable clients. See generally Donald G. Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal
Counseling and Negotiation Models: Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context,
34 UCLA L. REV. 811, 816-22 (1987); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal
and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990).
113. Justine A. Dunlap, I Don’t Want to Play God—A Response to Professor Tremblay, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 2601, 2610-11 (1999).
114. See Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984); Gerald P. Lopez,
Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J.
1603 (1989); Gerald P. Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially
Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1989); see also GERALD P.
LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (Robert
W. Gordon & Margaret Jane Radin eds., 1992) [hereinafter LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING].
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Many others echo the call for community-based lawyering.115 Anthony
Alfieri expanded the dialogue about client-centered lawyering, highlighting
the manner in which traditional interactions between attorney and client
replicate the oppressive dynamics imposed on marginalized communities
more broadly. He further decried the shortcomings of the traditional
poverty law strategies that combine individual representation and impact
litigation, but failed to enact any sustained reform. Instead, Alfieri
suggested that poverty lawyers transform their practice to focus on
strategies aimed at mass mobilization, consciousness-raising and
empowerment of marginalized people. Espousing a model of “dialogic
empowerment” to combat the subordination inherent in the traditional
model of representation,116 Alfieri advocates collaborative lawyering, a
style that envisions a dynamic even more acutely sensitive to the attorneyclient dynamic than that advanced through client-centered lawyering.117
Building on those alternative lawyering theories, Marsico championed
“facilitative lawyering,” characterized by its client-directed function and its
determination to avoid over-politicizing issues at the cost of individual
client goals. 118
Michael Diamond offers a friendly critique of the collaborative, clientcentered and facilitative lawyering models, in which he reproaches their
focus on process at the expense of substantive outcome.119 Diamond
argues that characterizing the dynamic between lawyer and client as
paramount often reduces problems to discrete legal and relational issues,
disregarding the broader context in which those challenges arise.120 Other
critics have noted that while dissecting the nature of the attorney-client
115. See John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at
the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1936-37 (1999) (“Leftactivist, non-regnant cause lawyering must first be community-based, because the poverty we confront
is primarily situated at the intersection of race, space, and poverty. . . . Community, here, is not a
romantic abstraction, but rather the site of material deprivation and relations that are formed to cope
with oppressive circumstances.”).
116. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic
Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659, 695-711 (1987); see also Anthony V. Alfieri,
Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107
(1991) [hereinafter Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law] (arguing that lawyers should exercise caution
to avoid silencing client voices in framing and editing stories to fit in with the conventions of legal
advocacy, a practice that often extracts elements of client dignity); Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of
Turn: The Story of Josephine V., 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619 (1991) (noting that client participation is
integral to avoiding attorney paternalism and domination).
117. Piomelli, supra note 106, at 438-39.
118. See Richard D. Marsico, Working for Social Change and Preserving Client Autonomy: Is
There a Role for “Facilitative” Lawyering?, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 639, 639-40 (1995).
119. See Diamond, supra note 93.
120. See id. at 77-78.
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relationship is a worthy endeavor, the exercise is of limited utility.
Diamond asserts that much of the scholarship regarding the attorney-client
dynamic has not resonated beyond the ivory tower of the academy. The
emphasis on the disempowering nature of attorney-client interactions has
engendered some hostility between academics and practicing lawyers, who
resent that their professional and political efficacy, premised on
“progressive lawyering,” is consistently questioned.121 Moreover, the
focus on micro-interpersonal dynamics comes at the expense of more
urgent demands to pursue some measure of permanent relief for
marginalized clients.122 Diamond opines that effective advocacy on behalf
of subordinated populations requires far more, and he espouses activist
lawyering as the most effective model, noting that “[t]oo often, . . .
attorneys who serve poor communities see their function as closely
approximating the traditional model: as serving individuals with problems
that are readily susceptible to purely legal intervention.”123 In his view,
addressing problems that “are chronic, political and economic, rather than
acute and traditionally legal,”124 requires a more systemic and
comprehensive response.125
121. Gary L. Blasi, What’s a Theory For?: Notes on Reconstructing Poverty Law Scholarship, 48
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1063, 1088 (1994) “Resistance stiffens further when practitioners perceive the
critical messages as floating down from the serene heights of law schools in voices that seem haughty,
hostile, distant, and distinctly uninterested in dialogue.” Id. at 1088-89. Blasi wryly observes the irony
that critics of silenced-client narratives ignore the effect of disregarding “poverty-lawyer narrative[s].”
Id. at 1089. He further notes that a risk of post-modernism is that it precludes an orchestrated and
strategic response to the ramifications of collective narratives, and cautiously stresses the utility of
meta-theory. Id. at 1093-94. Blasi cites Barbara Bezdek’s work in a Baltimore housing court, in which
she went beyond amplifying individual silenced voices to generalize from compiled client experiences,
in order to search for more comprehensive solutions to systemic problems facing clients. Id. at 109192.
122. Blasi commented in 1994 that a significant amount of scholarship focused on the attorneyclient relationship to the detriment of larger issues: “The implicit suggestion is that the main problem
faced by poor and subordinated people is not unemployment, illness, hunger, homelessness,
degradation, or racist oppression, but rather the ‘interpretive violence’ done to their narratives by
poverty lawyers.” Id. at 1089; see also Lucie White, Paradox, Piece-Work, and Patience, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 853, 858 (1992) [hereinafter White, Paradox] (criticizing Alfieri’s client-centered approach for
“shift[ing] our attention away from . . . other kinds of violence” facing impoverished communities).
123. Diamond, supra note 93, at 75.
124. Id. at 76.
125. See id. at 77-78. In response to the criticisms leveled at members of the practicing bar, some
practitioners concede the limits of legal strategies but bristle at the suggestion that their work on behalf
of individual clients is inconsequential merely because it lacks global impact or because it relies
primarily on legal remedies. Paul Tremblay acknowledges that traditional lawyering efforts on behalf
of the poor have had mixed and limited success. He notes, however, that traditional poverty lawyering
strategies have been continually dissected and modified. See Paul R. Tremblay, Acting “A Very Moral
Type of God”: Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (1999). In contrast, the longterm efficacy and impact of the more recent mobilization efforts are more speculative in nature. Id. at
2478; see also Dean Hill Rivkin, Reflections on Lawyering for Reform: Is the Highway Alive Tonight?,
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D. OVERARCHING THEMES IN PROGRESSIVE LAWYERING
As evidenced by the evolving and competing theories, many areas
overlap, but neither progressive lawyers nor clinicians endorse a monolithic
empowerment strategy for marginalized communities and clients. Despite
the lack of consensus, certain themes recur, including the need to leverage
change for low-income constituencies by augmenting the historical tools of
individual and impact litigation with more community-based strategies.
Intrinsic to a more inclusive and empowering approach to social justice
lawyering is the need to reconceptualize the nature of the attorney-client
relationship. Moreover, many lawyers have adopted an approach that
encompasses a holistic approach to alleviating client problems. As lawyers
and clinicians continue to explore, assess and refine their empowerment
strategies, it is critical to chronicle these self-reflective experiences through
reflective and empirical scholarship. As this scholarship matures, the
lessons learned should be accessible to the diverse constituencies clinicians
seek to integrate into comprehensive law reform efforts.
III. THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CLINIC: DESCRIPTION AND
CRITIQUE OF THE MODEL
The prior sections have noted the history and importance of a social
justice mission within clinical education, as well as widespread calls for
improved access to justice and a tilt toward more comprehensive, holistic
anti-subordination strategies. Accordingly, a law school’s clinical program
should devote some institutional resources toward advancing a social
justice mission, imparting skills and values consistent with that goal, and
energizing law students to commit time toward public interest lawyering.
As self-reflective practitioners, we must carefully analyze the theories that
inform our clinical pedagogy and structure, make enlightened and
intentional choices about competing priorities, and critically reflect on
whether our clinic choices are designed to maximize those overarching
goals.126
In the Anti-Discrimination Clinic, the law school’s in-house civil
clinic, the students served as volunteer counsel to a state administrative
agency, assisting MCAD prosecute violations of the state antidiscrimination laws. Section A describes MCAD’s mission and relevant
procedures. Next, Section B critiques the clinic, first describing the Anti64 TENN. L. REV. 1065 (1997) (arguing that it is elitist to denigrate lawyers who pursue rights-based
strategies for individual clients).
126. See Piomelli, supra note 106, at 514 (discussing the “reflective practitioner”).
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Discrimination Clinic’s ability to provide opportunities in skills training
and exposure to issues of ethics and professionalism, and then evaluating
whether this model advanced social justice goals. This Section concludes
that the model had flaws that impeded the law school’s ability to maximize
social justice goals. Finally, Section C situates the critique within the
broader clinical program of the law school; it notes that the clinic’s
shortcoming was particularly troubling given that none of the law school’s
other clinical offerings professed an explicit focus on social justice.
Although the polemic surrounding whether lawyers who work for the
government engage in social justice work is arguably relevant to this
analysis, it is not the focus of this discussion. Nevertheless, it warrants
brief mention. For many attorneys, working for the government, or
working in a practice area that is not exclusively situated within the private
sphere, fits squarely within a conception of lawyering for the common
good and, as such, qualifies as public interest lawyering.127 As others have
noted, prosecutors handling domestic violence cases, hate crimes, impaired
driving cases, tax and securities fraud, and environmental violations are
considered by many to be practicing for the public good and, accordingly,
engaging in public interest work.128 However, much has been written about
the challenges agency lawyers face in defining and vindicating the public
interest.129 Indeed, some have argued that by their nature, governmental
agencies face significant structural challenges to fulfilling their public
service mission. Moreover,
[s]ome critics of the [“public interest serving”] role for government
attorneys argue that government attorneys cannot work to pursue the
public interest because the very concept of a “public interest” is
unintelligible and cannot provide a workable guidepost for government

127. See Russell Engler, From the Margins to the Core: Integrating Public Service Legal Work
into the Mainstream of Legal Education, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 479, 493 (2006) (“Many people . . .
simply believe that regardless of the terminology, government work is public service and/or public
interest.”).
128. See Luize E. Zubrow, Is Loan Forgiveness Divine? Another View, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
451, 501-03 (1991) (arguing that the definition of public interest lawyering should include government
lawyers that represent the “public at large”); see also Mary C. Daly et al., Contextualizing Professional
Responsibility: A New Curriculum for a New Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 204 (1995)
(“defin[ing] public interest law broadly”).
129. See generally Steven K. Berenson, The Duty Defined: Specific Obligations that Follow from
Civil Government Lawyers’ General Duty to Serve the Public Interest, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 13 (2003);
Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil Litigation?, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
235 (2000).
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attorneys with regard to the choices and decisions that they must make in
their professional roles.130

In addition to the definitional challenges, government lawyers’
decision-making process in individual cases is necessarily influenced by a
number of factors, including resource allocation and politics.131 As noted
by one commentator, another “vexing problem . . . is how to think about
the professional responsibilities of government lawyers. The problem
arises because of the tension between the government lawyer’s public role
and the private relationship basis of traditional conceptions of legal
ethics.”132
MCAD is charged with enforcing the state’s anti-discrimination laws
and eradicating discrimination. In serving victims of discrimination, many
of whom represent historically underserved constituencies, the agency has
a clear and important public interest mission. Moreover, state participation
in the enforcement of civil rights through regulatory agencies in some ways
sets MCAD apart from other administrative agencies that may be at greater
risk of agency “capture.”133 However, it is beyond the scope of this paper
to make sweeping judgments about the efficacy of either administrative
agencies generally or MCAD specifically in promoting social justice.
Instead, the discussion is focused on the administrative agency as the
location for clinical work with explicit social justice goals. While this
distinction may seem inconsequential, goals of clinical pedagogy add a
distinctly different element to the analysis. The discussion below is limited
to an evaluation of situating a clinic with explicit social justice goals within
an administrative agency, as well as critiquing other skills and values-based
considerations.

130. Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government
Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 790 (2000) (analyzing the tension between the
professional responsibilities of government lawyers and proposing a paradigm that fuses both the
agency loyalty and public interest models).
131. See Richard Abel, Civil Rights and Wrongs, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1421, 1425 (2005)
(“Government agencies (state attorneys general, city attorneys, prosecutors, the EEOC, and state and
city anti-discrimination bodies) are constrained and shaped by inadequate resources, bureaucracy, and
career incentives.”).
132. Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency Lawyers, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1170, 1170 (2002).
133. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975).
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A. THE MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
MCAD134 is the state agency charged with safeguarding equal
opportunity by enforcing the state’s anti-discrimination laws in
employment, housing, public accommodations, credit, mortgage lending
and education.135 The agency has the authority to receive, investigate and
adjudicate complaints of unlawful practices.136 In order to file a civil claim
alleging discrimination, a claim must first be filed with MCAD.137
Assuming the case meets jurisdictional requirements, MCAD assigns an
investigator to probe the allegations.138 After completing the investigation,
the investigator must determine whether there is probable cause to believe
that the respondent engaged in discriminatory conduct.139 If MCAD issues
a Probable Cause Finding, the investigator “endeavor[s] to eliminate the
unlawful practice” through a process of “conference, conciliation and
persuasion.”140 Once an investigator issues a Probable Cause Finding,
MCAD departs from its neutral, investigative function to assume a partisan
role, and Commission Counsel is assigned to present the case on behalf of
If efforts to settle the case through conciliation are
MCAD.141
unsuccessful, MCAD assigns an investigating Commissioner who can
authorize “post-determination discovery,”142 which can include
134. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 56 (West 2004); see also id. ch. 151B, § 2.
135. See id. ch. 151B, § 4 (unlawful employment and business practices); id. ch. 151C, § 2 (unfair
educational practices); id. ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (unlawful public accommodation practices); id. ch. 149,
§ 105A (unlawful wage practices). Under a work-sharing agreement with the EEOC, MCAD also
processes cases that arise under certain federal statutes. See id. ch. 151B, § 6. Also, there is a parallel
enforcement structure which allows complainants and, in certain circumstances, respondents to remove
the case from MCAD to the court system. Id. ch. 151B, §9.
136. Id. ch. 151B, § 3(6). Note that while MCAD has the power to engage in rulemaking,
investigation and adjudication, the EEOC—MCAD’s federal analog—has only investigative and
adjudicative authority. Id. ch. 151B, § 3(5)-(7).
137. Id. ch. 151B, §§ 5-6. Under the work-sharing agreement with the EEOC, complaints arising
under federal anti-discrimination laws must first be filed with MCAD, but complainants can then elect
to have the case processed by the EEOC. See id.
138. Id. ch. 151B, § 5; see 804 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.10(7)(b) (1999). The investigative process
prior to a determination that “Probable Cause” exists depends on whether both parties are represented
by counsel. See 804 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.13(7) (1999).
139. 804 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.15(7)(a) (1999).
A finding of Probable Cause shall be made when, after appropriate investigation, the
Investigating Commissioner concludes that there is sufficient evidence upon which a factfinder could form a reasonable belief that it is more probable than not that the respondent
committed an unlawful practice. In making this determination, disputes involving genuine
issues of material fact are to be reserved for determination at hearing.
Id.
140. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, §5 (West 2004).
141. See 804 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.09(5)(a) (1999). Represented complainants may move to have
private counsel prosecute the case as MCAD’s agent. Id. § 1.09(5)(c).
142. Id. § 1.19.
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interrogatories, document subpoenas and depositions.143 After discovery
has been completed, the parties may request a Certification Conference, in
which the Commissioner determines whether administrative adjudication of
the case is in the public interest.144
In the clinic, students served as Volunteer Commission Counsel and
typically undertook representation in the cases after a finding of probable
cause had been issued, first appearing in the case at the conciliation stage.
Under this model, the agency, rather than the complainants, was the clinic’s
“client.” At the time I analyzed the program, the clinic docket consisted
primarily of employment discrimination cases, but also included housing,
education and public accommodation cases.
B. CRITIQUE OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION CLINIC MODEL
In critiquing the Anti-Discrimination Clinic model, the article
evaluates issues of general clinical pedagogy as well as the clinic’s success
in articulating and advancing a social justice mission. Under that general
rubric, the article addresses aspects of the clinic that range from prosaic to
overarching. Not all areas of appraisal can be neatly characterized as either
positive or negative, as often there are advantages and disadvantages of a
particular attribute. The first three sections of this critique address areas of
general clinical pedagogy. Subsection 1 begins with a description of the
general administrative considerations of the clinical construct. Subsections
2 and 3 discuss the skills training and professionalism opportunities. The
final three subsections focus on social justice concerns. Subsection 4
discusses how the clinic satisfied considerations of access to justice and
multicultural sensitivity. Subsection 5 uses the criticisms of rights-based
strategies to evaluate the clinic’s ability to satisfy social justice goals.
Subsection 6 then analyzes the implications of exposing students to the
attorney-client dynamic under a model where the students owed their
professional loyalty to an agency, rather than to individual clients. Finally,
Subsection 7 summarizes these findings, concluding that the MCAD model
did not adequately pursue social justice objectives.
As noted earlier, the critiques of rights-based strategies and historical
conceptions of the attorney-client relationship are inextricably intertwined.
I artificially separate them for purposes of clarity. The following
discussion focuses on the limitations of situating a clinic with explicit
social justice goals within an administrative agency and discusses other
143.
144.

Id. §§ 1.13(2), 1.14(2).
Id. § 1.20(3) (2004).
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skills and values-based considerations. Ultimately, distinct advantages
accrued from our role as Commission Counsel, especially the ability to
teach practical skills, ethics and professionalism. However, the model was
less successful in advancing a social justice mission. Admittedly, many of
the criticisms leveled in the sections on social justice are applicable to
many clinics. Nevertheless, the impossibility of constructing a clinic that
satisfies all goals should not preclude a critical and comprehensive
assessment of each model’s merits and shortcomings.
1. General Administrative Issues
The Anti-Discrimination Clinic offered several practical, logistical
and administrative benefits. While these concerns may seem mundane at
first blush, clinical pedagogy is only as effective as the actual experiences it
consistently offers to students. In the clinic, working with the state
enforcement agency eliminated any pressure on the clinic to maintain a
public presence in order to generate cases.145 Moreover, because the
agency conducted the initial case intake and the clinic did not need to
conduct screening for income or other eligibility, the students spent more
of their time working on cases that at least initially appeared to be
meritorious.146 Because the clinic and MCAD enjoyed a collegial
institutional relationship, the two parties engaged in an ongoing,
constructive dialogue as to how best balance the competing interests of
maximizing the learning opportunities for the students and providing a
public service to the agency. MCAD accommodated the time constraints
associated with an academic schedule by attempting to expedite the
scheduling of motions and hearings, thus increasing opportunities for
students to develop a case and shepherd it through significant progress
during the semester.147 Moreover, the scheduling staff at MCAD
endeavored to accommodate the law school’s summer hiatus in order to

145. In fact, one could argue the agency has a captive audience. In order to file a lawsuit, cases
must initially be filed with the agency, although they can be subsequently removed to state court.
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 151B, § 9 (West 2004).
146. Arguably, students develop critical evaluation skills by conducting intake interviews and
initial case assessments. Given the small number of cases filed with MCAD that meet the probable
cause requirement, I believe that the students were better off receiving pre-screened cases. However,
by first appearing in cases after the initial complaint had been framed, the students lost critical
opportunities to develop case theory.
147. Obviously, opposing counsel can elect to obstruct the progress irrespective of MCAD’s best
efforts to move a case along.
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minimize the clinic’s obligation to provide full-time ongoing coverage,
allowing me more time to conceptualize and develop other projects.148
Despite these advantages, when I first took over the clinic, a number
of administrative difficulties demanded prompt attention.149 The clinic had
transitioned from a one-semester program to a two-semester program,
which enhanced the continuity of case-handling. Unfortunately, the
clinic’s expansion had an initial impact on the availability of cases at the
appropriate procedural posture for clinic representation.150 Given the
varied availability of suitable cases from the Commission Counsel’s
litigation docket, which fluctuated between overwhelming and insufficient,
I enjoyed little discretion in selecting the most pedagogically appropriate
cases. Moreover, the clinic appeared in cases based on investigations we
did not conduct and that were completed and processed by the chronically
overworked and under-sourced investigative staff. 151 Not infrequently, a

148. MCAD’s efforts at cooperative scheduling were not always successful with regard to summer
scheduling dates and case obligations.
149. In addition to seeking to enhance the clinic within the confines of the MCAD structure, I
explored other opportunities that would supplement our role as Volunteer Commission Counsel, while
still maintaining overall instructional coherence. In the fall of 2000, I was appointed Special Assistant
Attorney General, with the expectation that the clinic would assist the Attorney General’s office in
prosecuting a number of housing discrimination cases, in addition to conducting community training on
the Massachusetts Hate Crimes Law. Unfortunately, the Attorney General’s docket consisted of only
seven housing discrimination cases, a few of which settled and others which were subject to
interminable delays. Moreover, the school system in which we expected to conduct the training was
initially resistant, so we were unable to schedule any training sessions. It became apparent that this
would not develop into either a consistent or sufficient source of appropriate work.
150. Due to a chronic backlog at the agency, cases were always abundant. However, many cases
were delayed in the predetermination investigative stage, prior to the clinic’s involvement. For a
discussion of the ramifications of this backlog, see Toni Lester, Queering the Office: Can Sexual
Orientation Employment Discrimination Laws Transform Work Place Norms for LGBT Employees?, 73
UMKC L. REV. 643, 654-55 (2005) (analyzing, from the plaintiff’s perspective, whether
antidiscrimination laws were effective in combating workplace discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and noting that inadequate resources at MCAD constructed a significant impediment to
achieving justice). Lester specifically notes that “beginning in the mid-1980’s, state budgetary
restrictions forced major cutbacks at a time when the number of complaints was steadily increasing.”
Id. (quoting 1996 MASS. COMM’N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION ANN. REP. 8). “This problem became
further magnified by the inclusion of anti-disability and sexual orientation discrimination provisions . . .
and the dramatic increase in sexual harassment claims . . . .” Id. at 655. Lester concludes that the
backlog “remained a significant challenge,” id. at 655, arguing that a “discrimination law that does not
have a sufficient budget to fund its enforcement has no teeth.” Id. at 654.
151. Whether by design, inadvertence or necessity, MCAD was hamstrung by inadequate staffing,
funding and resources, which impeded the agency’s ability to pursue a proactive agenda to eradicate
discrimination. MCAD must determine whether conducting a public hearing is in the public interest,
while considering, among other things, resource issues. If the agency concludes that a hearing is not in
the public interest, MCAD may then dismiss the complaint, thereby leaving unrepresented and indigent
complainants with no opportunity to avail themselves of the court system. One could argue that
allowing the agency to rely on students for work decreased pressure on the legislature to adequately
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more thorough review of a case revealed a lack of merit, yet we usually felt
obligated to proceed with conciliation and discovery rather than trigger a
reversal of a recent decision.152 Because we owed our allegiance to the
agency and its priorities, our autonomy was necessarily constrained. As
with many hybrid clinics, there was occasional tension as we navigated
between the educational needs of the students and the pressure on the
agency to process cases more quickly than was reasonable given their
enormous caseload.153
2. General Clinical Pedagogy/Skills Training
The Anti-Discrimination Clinic fulfilled a variety of general
pedagogical objectives common to many clinics. The clinic provided
opportunities for students to practice a range of fundamental lawyering
skills enumerated in the MacCrate Report,154 including interviewing,
counseling,155 fact investigation, negotiation, and discovery planning and
execution.156 The training in these areas benefited the large number of
fund the agency; but given the political climate at the time, I suspected that no additional resources
would be allocated irrespective of the clinic’s involvement.
152. Mechanisms were in place that would allow for a reconsideration of the initial probable cause
finding, but in practice, it seemed impolitic to reverse the finding before the discovery process had been
completed. In real practice, students will invariably confront the fact that, despite their best efforts to
screen and investigate potential clients, cases unravel for reasons beyond their control. It was
educational for students to understand that cases often develop very differently from the path suggested
by their initial assessment, which encouraged them to consider what constitutes an informed and
accurate preliminary assessment. Students must learn to advocate, marshal the evidence and move
forward even in the face of weak cases. However, in a different clinical construct, we would be able to
exercise greater control over information elicited during initial intake and conduct some investigation
and legal research before committing to ongoing involvement in a case.
153. As with many challenges that arise in clinical education, this tension created teaching
opportunities. In many hybrid clinics, opportunities for reflection and institutional critique are
enhanced by the students’ exposure to the inner machinations of the agency. In this clinic, although
students served as volunteer agency counsel, they were not integrated into the agency milieu.
Depositions, meetings with clients and other case activities were conducted at the law school clinic
building rather than the MCAD office, and student interactions with MCAD staff were primarily limited
to communications regarding scheduling, conferences, hearings and attending conciliations. Students
therefore had a role similar to that of private counsel interfacing with the agency.
154. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 35, at 138-40 (listing fundamental lawyering skills).
155. Because students were counseling agency complainants rather than clients with whom they
had an attorney-client relationship, they did not always practice the widely preferred client-centered
counseling methods.
156. Theoretically, students had the opportunity to practice trial skills by presenting their cases at
public hearing. However, given the pressures on the agency to settle cases and the nature of civil
litigation generally, most of the cases were resolved in advance of the hearing. In practice, only four
cases were adjudicated at a hearing over the seven semesters. The vast majority of student work
involved interviewing complainants immediately after a finding of probable cause, preparing a
memorandum of damages, engaging in the conciliation and subsequent negotiations, and conducting
discovery, including interrogatories and depositions. Arguably, engaging in a wide variety of tasks
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WNEC graduates who went on to work in solo or small firm practices,
where they immediately assumed case responsibility with little or no
mentoring, thus enhancing the likelihood that they provided competent
representation.157 The ABA notes that “students who expect to enter
practice in a relatively unsupervised practice setting have a special need for
opportunities to obtain skills instruction.”158 The clinic also provided a
forum and context for the classic clinical goals of examining the
application of doctrine to real life situations, allowing students to act in the
role of a lawyer, critiquing the law and legal institutions, imparting the
habit of self-reflective lawyering and introducing students to general
practice management issues.
3. Professionalism and Ethics
The clinic allowed students to explore issues of ethics and
professionalism in real-world situations, under the strains of law
practice.159 Immersion in full-blown adversarial proceedings forced
students to confront the unanticipated stresses, conflicts and tensions
attendant to adversarial lawyering that are wholly distinct from the pressure
they face in a traditional classroom setting.160 Students were exposed to
attorneys who conducted themselves with integrity and civility, as well as
those who employed scorched-earth litigation tactics.161 The students’

deprives students of the opportunity to practice one skill with sufficient repetition to truly refine that
skill. However, irrespective of the particular skill being practiced, I strived to emphasize self-reflection
as a habit that students should cultivate throughout their careers as a lawyer, enabling them to engage in
ongoing professional development. See Aiken, supra note 5, at 289, who comments:
We have learned that if we can teach our students, at best, how to reflect on their experience,
engage in meaningful self-criticism and learn lessons on their own, then we have
accomplished a great deal. We have launched the student on [the] way toward being that
skillful lawyer we would like to produce.
157. See Steven C. Bahls, Preparing General Practice Attorneys: Context-Based Lawyer
Competencies, 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 63, 63-64 (1991).
158. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 35, at 330.
159. See Melissa L. Breger et al., Teaching Professionalism in Context: Insights from Students,
Clients, Adversaries, and Judges, 55 S.C. L. REV. 303, 308-9 (2003) (describing professionalism as
fluid and contextual, and noting that “clinical legal education, with its convergence of theory and realworld practice, provides an ideal opportunity for teaching professionalism and ethics to students in
meaningful ways”).
160. See Rose, supra note 75, at 451. “The professional identity of many law students begins to
emerge in the reflective environment of clinics,” id., making it imperative that clinical professors strive
to model professional, self-reflective behavior. See id.
161. Although I encourage students to develop their own conceptions and standards of
professionalism, I am often surprised by the degree to which they were tempted to adapt their style to
that modeled by opposing counsel, particularly when that style is combative and insolent. I encourage
students to explore whether adjusting their standards of professionalism and courtesy to those of their
adversary perpetuates the very aspects of lawyering despised by both the bar and the public.
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exposure to issues of professional reputation was enhanced because the
Springfield MCAD office is small, and many attorneys carrying substantial
MCAD caseloads appear there with regularity. On a purely pragmatic
level, students knew that the clinic was a repeat player in a small legal
community, and this realization enhanced their understanding of the
importance of cultivating and maintaining a reputation of professional and
ethical behavior, both for individual cases and for their long-term
effectiveness while advocating in that venue. Students also had the
opportunity to explore and develop their own “philosophy of lawyering.”162
Another important aspect of professionalism is developing sensitivity
to multicultural issues.163 Irrespective of the area of practice ultimately
selected by a law student, in an increasingly multicultural world, lawyers
must attain some level of cross-cultural competence, and law schools
should take seriously their obligation to cultivate sensitivity to diversity
issues.164 “Until relatively recently many, perhaps most, American lawyers
could easily survive professionally and personally without multicultural
consciousness. Many, if not most, functioned in a predominantly white
legal culture.”165 However, demographic trends support the premise that
lawyers must develop multicultural competence, both nationally and
globally.166 Therefore, it is critical for students, even those who do not
discern the immediate value of developing these skills, to understand that
they will not be insulated from the diverse world. Working at MCAD
162. See Nathan M. Crystal, Developing a Philosophy of Lawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 75, 75 (2000) (“Almost all significant ethical decisions that lawyers face in the practice
of law involve discretion. For some of these decisions, no rules or standards guide lawyers.”).
163. The MacCrate Report specifically proscribes discrimination, under the category of “Striving
to Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality,” which cautions attorneys to avoid engaging in “any form of
discrimination . . . in one’s professional interactions with clients, witnesses, support staff, and other
individuals.” MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 35, at 213-14. This prohibition also reinforces the
importance of cultivating sensitivity to cross-cultural issues that enable attorneys to recognize and avoid
more subtle biases.
164. See generally Charles R. Calleros, Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural
Society, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 140 (1995); Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural
Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001); Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes:
The Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345 (1997)
(discussing the importance of training law students to practice law with cultural sensitivity); Aiken,
supra note 37; David Dominguez, Beyond Zero-Sum Games: Multiculturalism as Enriched Law
Training for All Students, 44 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 175 (1994).
165. Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Competence, Multicultural Lawyering and Race, 3 FLA.
COASTAL L.J. 219, 229 (2002).
166. See Barry et al., supra note 17, at 62 (citing projections by the U.S. Census Bureau that by
2050, the percentages of Caucasians and persons of color will be equal); see also David Hall, Giving
Birth to a Racially Just Society in the 21st Century, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 927, 935 (1999)
(suggesting that “by the year 2030, the number of people of color will exceed the number of whites in
this country”).
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immersed students in an area of practice that virtually guaranteed a
multicultural clientele. Because of the breadth of the state antidiscrimination law, students were exposed to members of a range of
“protected classes,” including race, national origin, gender, religion, age,
sexual orientation and disability.167 Working with a diverse group of
complainants forced students to “perceive the relevance of race to
lawyering. Lawyers approach interactions with clients with unexamined,
often unconscious, assumptions that our clients do, or at least should, share
our worldview.”168 Although mere exposure to multicultural clients is
insufficient to engender awareness and impart sensitivity, it does provide
the context to explore issues of multicultural awareness in a concrete,
rather than theoretical, way. In providing students with exposure to a
socio-economically and culturally diverse group of complainants, the AntiDiscrimination Clinic helped students to heighten their sensitivity to the
demands and necessity of functioning effectively in multicultural
environments.
By assuming primary professional responsibility for the cases, the
students were exposed to the ethical issues that attend real lawyering.169
The students’ introduction to one critical ethical issue, however, was quite
troubling. As agency attorneys, students were spared the challenges of
grappling with issues that accompany the duty of loyalty to individual
clients. In their role as Commission Counsel, students sometimes made
decisions that were antagonistic to the tenets of zealous advocacy for their
clients.170 Faced with crushing resource shortages, MCAD was in the

167. See Calleros, supra note 164, at 142 (noting the likelihood of such exposure by future
lawyers). Calleros posits that:
[S]ome law students may expect to practice law in a field in which race, gender, sexual
orientation, age, religion, physical and mental ability, economic class, and other significant
personal characteristics simply do not matter. Thus, a graduate may try to define a narrow
legal niche in which he or she can maintain at least the illusion that sensitivity to diverse
perspectives is unnecessary for a successful practice of law. However, even those who do not
seek to challenge the legal system’s claims of objectivity will find it difficult to deny or
escape the cultural pluralism of our national identity . . . .
Id. (footnote omitted).
168. Silver, supra note 165, at 220.
169. For a brief discussion about the importance of examining ethical issues as they arise in real
world situations, see Girth, supra note 79, at 604-06. “As reality becomes their operational context, law
students discover how difficult it is to identify the correct ethical decision in a particular strategic
situation or context.” Id.
170. The costs and benefits of our adversarial system’s model of zealous representation is a
dominant topic of ethics discourse. Nevertheless, it is the paradigm under which lawyers must
discharge their professional duties. Numerous scholars have examined the morality of the zealous
representation model. See, e.g., Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 9,
13 (1995) (discussing moral activism, which “in its broadest sense demands accountability from
lawyers for their actions, and tends not to permit the mere fact of occupational role expectations to
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unenviable position of considering whether prosecuting an individual
complainant’s meritorious case was in the broad public interest, rather than
focusing on the injustice visited on the individual complainant.171 While
this determination is intrinsic to the structure of administrative agency
practice, resource-driven decision-making is not always ideal for the
aggrieved parties.
Although the clinic students faced less pressure than MCAD staff with
respect to heavy caseloads, many students had to resist the temptation to
coerce complainants to settle.172 I observed instances in which pressures
on the students unrelated to the complainant’s case were intertwined with
or dissembled behind their concept of the agency’s duty to the “public
interest.” This buffer could obscure the necessary self-reflection about
whether the settlement was consciously or unconsciously influenced by
other factors, such as insecurities, antipathy or frustration with the
complainant or opposing counsel, or competing time pressures.173
Furthermore, students lapsed into a paternalistic mode with surprising ease.
At times discouraged by the hurdles of prevailing in difficult cases,
students made subjective judgments about a fair settlement colored by their
own circumstances and cloaked behind arguments about the agency’s
justify lawyer conduct”). For the arguments advanced by theorists advocating an activist model of
ethical behavior, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988) (arguing in
part that lawyers should not use their roles within the adversarial system to shield themselves from
introspection about their choices and behavior); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988) (asserting that lawyers, through a merit- or justice-based analysis,
should possess ethical discretion to achieve a legally (not morally) just result). But see Stephen
Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116, 178 (1990) (arguing
that allowing lawyers to engage in unacceptable conduct so long as they are promoting the greater good
is ripe for abuse, given such a rule’s subjectivity). See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F.
COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994); Beverly Balos, The Bounds
of Professionalism: Challenging Our Students; Challenging Ourselves, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 129 (1997).
171. The obligation is to seek a reasonable settlement, rather than maximize the outcome for the
client.
172. Students often believed that the complainants overvalued their damages, and at times
overemphasized the weaknesses of a complainant’s position, a tendency not uncommon to new lawyers.
173. I attempted to expose students to these extrinsic influences in the seminar portion of the
clinic. For example, I used a negotiation exercise designed to confront students with complicated
pressures and nuanced attorney motives that could be characterized as less than pure. Moreover,
students sometimes viewed situations exclusively from their perspective. This was particularly acute
when students were frustrated with a complainant’s lack of responsiveness, such as a failure to
promptly return phone calls, without considering possible explanations. Students also often lacked
empathy in understanding a complainant’s resistance to, and resentment about, a settlement offer they
felt cajoled into accepting. For a brief discussion on the importance of encouraging students to examine
their reactions to clients, see Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of the
Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
695, 729-30 (1994) (arguing that “civic republican” dialogue among clinic supervisors, students and
clients facilitates both student and client empowerment).
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limited resources. As in real practice, mounting pressures require constant
vigilance to ensure that decision-making is premised on considerations
related to the particular case rather than the attorney’s extrinsic pressures.
In non-agency practice, however, at least the professional regulatory
scheme mandates deference to client decisions and goals in many
matters.174 For better or worse, we are training lawyers to practice in a
system in which they are ethically bound to exalt individual rights over
collective justice and in which client prerogative is sacrosanct.175
4. Access to Justice
The unmet legal needs of low-income and moderate-income
individuals is a pervasive problem, and law students represent a resource
that can begin to satisfy the need for legal services.176 Moreover, because
students’ first exposure to lawyers and lawyering is typically in law school,
it is incumbent upon law schools to expose and sensitize students to
concepts of unequal access to justice.177 As Russell Engler notes, “[i]f law
school graduates are unaware of the extent of unmet legal needs, that topic
likely was not a focus of their legal education.”178 Under the MCAD
174. Another risk of the agency counsel model is that respondents typically required complainants
to sign standard settlement agreements which waived their rights to pursue other potential causes of
action. Entering into settlement agreements in reliance on the advice of agency counsel left
complainants without the protections that attach from an advocate retained to act on their behalf.
Moreover, as Volunteer Commission Counsel, we did not advise complainants about the possible
impact regarding the receipt of public benefits or tax consequences related to accepting a settlement, as
those areas were deemed outside our charge and expertise.
175. But cf. Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers Should Be Lawyers, But What Does That Mean?: A
Response to Aiken & Wizner and Smith, 14 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 49 (2002) (comparing the
perspectives on appropriate professional role advanced by Wizner & Aiken, who encourage lawyers to
be more like social workers, with that of Abbe Smith, who vigorously defends the partisan nature of
zealous advocacy). Kruse notes that under the “lawyers as social worker” paradigm, a lawyer “analyzes
justice substantively and structurally, attends holistically to a client’s problem as embedded within the
context of multiple systems, and views client interests in terms of the client’s well-being,” id. at 76,
whereas “the zealous advocate sacrifices outcomes to procedure, preferring to preserve the lawyer’s
role in the adversary system rather than compromise it to appease the interests of justice in any
particular case.” Id. at 77.
176. See Stephen F. Befort & Eric S. Janus, The Role of Legal Education in Instilling an Ethos of
Public Service Among Law Students: Towards a Collaboration Between the Profession and the
Academy on Professional Values, 13 LAW & INEQ. 1 (1994). In 1994, there were 200,000 low-income
individuals whose legal needs went unsatisfied in Minnesota. Id. at 1. In attempting to address that
shortfall, Befort and Janus note that “[f]ar and away the largest untapped resource for meeting that need
is volunteer attorneys and law students.” Id. (citing Jeremy Lane, Executive Dir., Mid-Minnesota Legal
Servs., Remarks at A Symposium: Legal Education and Pro Bono, William Mitchell College of Law
(Apr. 8, 1994)).
177. See generally Louise G. Trubek, Introduction to the Symposium on New Approaches to
Poverty Law, Teaching, and Practice, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 235 (1995).
178. Engler, supra note 127, at 485.

66

REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

[Vol. 16:1

model, we failed to respond to the compelling charge to alleviate issues of
unequal access to justice, as clinic students did not provide services for
people who would otherwise go unrepresented.179 The laws enforced by
MCAD have fee shifting provisions intended to encourage private
enforcement for people who could not otherwise afford representation.
Moreover, many complainants with meritorious cases can retain counsel on
a contingency basis, although attorneys’ fees could be deducted from their
settlement proceeds. Finally, after MCAD issues a threshold finding that
probable cause exists, the complaint is further investigated and presented
by Commission counsel, whether or not the complainant can secure or
afford private counsel.180 As a result, a complainant’s case would be
presented by MCAD attorneys irrespective of the clinic’s involvement.181
Of equal importance, it is critical to the students’ professional
development that they are exposed to the vast and intractable problem of
unmet legal needs.182 Students can develop sensitivity to the fact that legal
services are inaccessible to many poor and middle-class families once they
are confronted with the realization that, absent their assistance, these clients
would be without legal counsel. Representing indigent clients who lack
adequate access to vindicate their rights helps students to
begin to appreciate the seriousness of the plight of persons who face a
mix of legal and social problems, who may not be able to articulate their
positions lucidly, whose limited resources may significantly limit
possible options, and who may perceive the law to be an oppressive
rather than positive force in their lives.183

179. But cf. William R. Mureiko, A Public Goods Approach to Calculating Reasonable Fees
Under Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 438, 452 (1989) (arguing that private civil rights
enforcement for the “have-nots” confers benefits to broader society). It is noteworthy that students
were exposed to the workings of an under-resourced state agency and could observe how insufficient
funding impedes justice. The students’ work alleviated some of the pressures created by understaffing
and allowed staff attorneys to focus their energy on other matters. It can be argued, however, that in
allowing the agency to rely on the clinic, we lessened the pressures on the agency and thereby enabled
the legislature to continue chronic under-funding.
180. Providing free agency counsel, however, presents its own set of challenges for complainants.
See Lester, supra note 150, at 654 (“Having access to a free agency-appointed lawyer, while financially
beneficial, had its downside, however, because since the agency tended to be understaffed, it might take
time before an MCAD attorney could direct his or her attention to a particular case.”).
181. It is important to note that prior to a finding of probable cause, MCAD plays a non-partisan,
investigative role. Given the small percentage of cases in which probable cause is found, complainants
may well have benefited from student advocacy prior to a Probable Cause Finding. However, that
would have raised a host of other pedagogical issues.
182. See Wizner, supra note 30, at 329 (noting that “[t]he student’s feeling of personal
responsibility in representing an individual client can grow into a feeling of social responsibility for the
provision of legal services to the poor”); see also Wizner & Aiken, supra note 4, at 1011.
183. Rose, Law Schools, supra note 75, at 451.
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Students struggling to navigate their first efforts at legal advocacy can
often appreciate the difficulty pro se litigants face. This realization can
instill a lifelong commitment to provide services to underrepresented
clients, either as a fulltime public interest lawyer or through pro bono
work.184 Law schools can and should serve the dual functions of providing
legal services to low-income people through a variety of endeavors,
including pro bono representation and clinics, and inculcating students with
the imperative to provide services to low-income persons.185
In considering the mission of their clinical programs, law schools
should strive to identify national trends and respond to the needs of the
stakeholders in the local community.186 Alan Houseman advocates for “the
development in each state of an integrated, coordinated, collaborative, and
comprehensive system of civil legal assistance to low-income persons that
seeks to achieve equal justice for all.”187 Law students can be an integral
part of this initiative.188 In order to evaluate and coordinate the delivery of
legal services to the poor, the Massachusetts Legal Assistance Corporation,
184. See id. at 453. See also Engler, supra note 33, at 135-38, in which he recounted his study of
data at New England School of Law to evaluate how student participation in clinics impacted the
likelihood that they would engage in pro bono work after graduation. He found that “[t]he most striking
comparison was not the variation from clinic to clinic, but from setting to setting: 73% of students in
legal services setting[s] answered that the work made them ‘more likely’ to do pro bono work,
compared to only 31% of the students in government settings, and 31% of the students in private
settings.” Id. In explaining their answers, students referred to “the learning of skills, contact with
clients, awareness of unmet legal needs, and gratification from helping others.” Id.
185. There is a distinction between advocating for underrepresented constituencies and addressing
unmet legal needs. It can be reasonably argued that complainants on Commission Counsel’s litigation
docket represented underserved populations, although not all of the complainants were indigent or
members of marginalized constituencies. The clinic did not, however, address the issue of unmet legal
needs. Some complainants faced impediments to obtaining private counsel, such as those with difficult
claims or cases in which the potential recovery was insufficient to attract private counsel on a
contingency basis. However, the availability of agency counsel to present cases made the clinic’s
services less compelling. As Engler notes in reference to externships, “[they] will not further the goals
of Promoting Equal Justice if the placements are not tied to that concept.” Engler, supra note 127, at
494.
186. See, e.g., Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Learning Through Service in a Clinical Setting: The
Effect of Specialization on Social Justice and Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 307, 317 (2001) (“In
a clinical setting, providing access to justice means designing a program to address needs for legal
service in our communities.”).
187. Houseman, supra note 53, at 372.
188. “The capacity of the law schools and the wider academic community to assist in the design
and assessment of methods used to address unmet legal needs should be encouraged.” LEGAL NEEDS
STUDY ADVISORY COMM., POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS LEGAL NEEDS SURVEY 5
(2003), available at http://www.masslegalservices.org/docs/Policy_Report._6.5.pdf; see also MASS.
STATE PLANNING BD. FOR CIVIL LEGAL SERVS., RECOMMENDATION FOR RECONFIGURATION INTO
FOUR LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION SERVICE AREAS (December 10, 2003), available at
http://www.masslegalservices.org/docs/XP-MLRI-TAGNO_20040331_100503.pdf [hereinafter MASS.
STATE PLANNING BD.] (discussing the role of law schools in the delivery of legal services).
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the state analog to the Legal Services Corporation, undertook a
comprehensive analysis of legal needs.189
The alarming results
demonstrated that access to legal services had deteriorated considerably
since the prior assessment in 1993.
Over 700,000 residents of
Massachusetts are eligible for legal services, qualifying with incomes of
125% of the federal poverty line or lower.190 Of those, over two-thirds
reported a minimum of one legal problem annually, “almost double that
reported in 1993.”191 Many of those with unmet legal needs reside in
Western Massachusetts.192 These disturbing findings reinforce the notion
that as the only law school in Western Massachusetts, WNEC should play a
critical role in augmenting access to legal services in its local
community.193

189.
190.

See MASS. STATE PLANNING BD., supra note 188.
See STATE PLANNING COMM., MASS. LEGAL AID, REPORT OF THE STRATEGIC PLANNING
COMMITTEE
OF
THE
MASSACHUSETTS
LEGAL
AID
PROGRAMS
20,
http://www.masslegalservices.org/docs/XP-MLRI-TAGNO_20040331_100503.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2004).
191. Id.
192. THE MASS. LEGAL ASSISTANCE CORP., MASSACHUSETTS LEGAL NEEDS SURVEY 36 (2003),
available at http://www.masslegalservices.org/docs/Data_report_final.pdf. The Massachusetts Legal
Assistance Corporation (MLAC) “funds and supports programs providing civil legal aid to low-income
residents in Massachusetts.” Id. at 3.
193. See, e.g., Engler, supra note 33, at 134-138 (describing the implementation of a clinic at New
England School of Law that addressed unmet legal needs). Engler discussed the findings of a
commission that “was appointed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, . . . [which] focused on
the unmet legal needs of the poor.” Id. at 135 n.124. The report noted that:
The commission believes that law schools should inculcate in all law students an
understanding that public service is an ethical and moral requirement of all attorneys. Many
leading law schools in the country, including Northeastern University School of Law, require
public service as a condition of graduation. By doing so, these law schools instruct students
in the value of public service and teach them how it may be performed. All law schools in
Massachusetts could increase access to justice and help ensure the continuation of high
professional standards by requiring their students to provide civil legal assistance to lowincome people.
Id. at 135 n.123 (quoting MASS. COMM’N ON EQUAL JUSTICE, EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE: RENEWING
THE COMMITMENT 56 (1996)).
A related issue is that legal services are unavailable for those who are only dollars above the
mandatory income eligibility guidelines imposed by LSC. These rigid rules do not fairly consider
whether a party with legal needs actually possesses the resources to retain representation. Some argue
for a modification of the guidelines to incorporate more flexible standards. However, easing the
arbitrary guidelines would increase the pool of LSC-eligible clients without a concomitant increase in
the number of legal aid lawyers, possibly decreasing overall access to legal services. See Dunlap, supra
note 113, at 2604. But note that the Massachusetts Student Practice Rule, Supreme Judicial Court Rule
3:03, allows students to represent indigent clients or the Commonwealth and its agencies. MASS. R.
S.J.C. 3:03. However, while “indigent” is not defined within the rule itself, it is defined under
Massachusetts General Law as 125% of federal poverty guidelines, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 261, §
27A (West 2004), thus maintaining the mandatory income cutoff.
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5. Limitations of Rights Based Strategies, Specifically in the
Discrimination Context
Through their work at MCAD, students were exposed to both the
obvious and nuanced ways that litigation has a limited ability both to
provide meaningful relief to individuals and to transform social behavior
more generally.194 This Subsection focuses on the potential implications of
the rights-based corrective strategies employed by the clinic for individuals
involved in adversarial proceedings and, more generally, the elusive nature
of systematic reform.195
a. The adversarial posture of cases eclipsed alternative problemsolving
The Anti-Discrimination Clinic demonstrated problem-solving skills
through adversarial adjudication, a perspective reinforced by the students’
exposure to the dispute resolution methods represented in their doctrinal
classes.196 Throughout law school, and in their study of appellate cases,
“students are imbued with the notion that litigation is the primary method
of resolving disputes,”197 and that winning is paramount. Both litigation
and law school often emphasize the winner-loser, “zero-sum game” nature
of conflicts,198 rather than promoting varied, less contentious and more
creative approaches to problem-solving. Because the clinic docket
consisted exclusively of cases that were fully immersed in adversarial
proceedings, students could not explore non-adversarial, alternative
problem-solving.199
Some critics note that an oft-cited reason for the public’s disdain for
the legal profession is the adversarial posturing adopted by its
194. For more on the importance of exposing law students to the limitations of legal remedies, see
Louise G. Trubek, Crossing Boundaries: Legal Education and the Challenge of the “New Public
Interest Law,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 455, 467 (2005) (noting that students “need to be educated in the
limits of law and legal institutions. Students must understand the limits of law so that they have a
realistic appreciation of the law’s potential. . . . Formal legal education programs should reflect the
messy reality of practice as well as lofty theoretical ideals.”).
195. For a discussion on innovative interdisciplinary approaches to combating discrimination, see
id. at 469-70.
196. Note that the clinic model does not empower complainants to advocate for themselves, as
they must rely on lawyers to present their case. Complainants need legal advice on substantive matters,
but they also need assistance in interpreting and navigating through the complicated regulatory
procedures necessary to administratively adjudicate the cases in front of MCAD.
197. Balos, supra note 170, at 140.
198. See, e.g., Krieger, Institutional Denial, supra note 78, at 116-19.
199. Complaints had already been filed, placing cases into the administrative adjudication process.
Although complainants could elect to engage in mediation or arbitration, it is generally difficult to
reverse the adversarial posture adopted by the parties once a complaint has been filed.
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professionals, “characterized by contentiousness, hostility toward
opponents and witnesses, incivility, and a view of litigation as a game.”200
Because dissatisfaction with the adversarial nature of lawyering is
prevalent,201 depriving students of exposure to creative problem-solving
outside of litigation is regrettable. Further, the impact of this dynamic on
lawyer well-being should be acknowledged.202 This effect is often
exacerbated because, once a dispute has degenerated to litigation,
relationships are often permanently ruptured, minimizing chances for
reconciliation. 203 This tension was present in the MCAD context because,
after an aggrieved party has filed a complaint with MCAD, the range of
possible solutions is more limited.204 Many believe that law schools should
encourage increased professionalism and civility in an attempt to
counteract public and personal dissatisfaction with the legal profession. In
order to achieve that lofty goal, law schools should engage in unflinching
self-reflection about the ways in which legal education inadvertently
reinforces, elevates and perpetuates the often fierce nature of litigationbased lawyering.205 Exposing students to creative problem-solving outside
200. Balos, supra note 170, at 140.
201. See Lawrence S. Krieger, What We’re Not Telling Law Students—and Lawyers—That They
Really Need to Know: Some Thoughts-In-Action Toward Revitalizing the Profession from Its Roots, 13
J.L. & HEALTH 1, 4 (1999) (“[S]tudies confirm the common experience of student distress during law
school, the negative public perception of lawyers, and simple observation of attorney behavior: lawyers
as a group tend to be stressed and relatively unhappy people.”).
202. See, e.g., BEST PRACTICES, supra note 48, at 21 (“It is well-known that lawyers suffer higher
rates of depression, anxiety and other mental illness, suicide, divorce, alcoholism and drug abuse, and
poor physical health than the general population or other occupations.”); see also, e.g., Patrick J.
Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical
Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 874-78 (1999) (arguing that unhappy lawyers are disproportionately
afflicted with mental health issues as compared to other professions); Harris, supra note 83, at 307-12
(documenting rising unhappiness among the practicing bar).
203. This dynamic can be counterproductive in cases in which the parties have an interest in
preserving an ongoing relationship, such as when a complainant wishes to remain in the employ of the
respondent. Many other conflicts would benefit by a dispute resolution approach that values the
importance of avoiding the irrevocable breakdown of relationships between parties, such as a divorce
involving children or a special education dispute. In those situations, the parties may be well served by
a collaborative problem-solving approach in order to minimize acrimony that can endure long past the
resolution of the conflict, to the detriment of the parties involved.
204. But see Thomas A. Kochan et al., An Evaluation of the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 233 (2000)
(discussing how MCAD did initiate a pilot alternative dispute resolution project, and although the
project was fraught with difficulties at the inception, over time the project improved and provided a
viable alternative to administrative adjudication).
205. See Alan M. Lerner, Law & Lawyering in the Workplace: Building Better Lawyers By
Teaching Students to Exercise Critical Judgment as Creative Problem Solver, 32 AKRON L. REV. 107,
109 n.2 (1999) (“[L]awyers who exercise critical judgment and function as thoughtful, reflective,
creative problem solvers can contribute significantly to reducing the volume and intensity of litigation
as a tool for resolving disputes, as well as reducing polarization in society.”).
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of the litigation context is one way to reinforce these concepts,206 and the
clinic’s failure to incorporate alternative problem-solving methods was
unfortunate.
b. Administrative adjudication often provided only partial relief
The clinic demonstrated multiple ways in which both the agency and
the law’s ability to remedy wrongs can be severely constrained. For
example, MCAD lacks the jurisdiction, resources and expertise to redress
violations of other laws that are often intertwined with the discrimination
complaints, such as wage and hour violations, and safety and collective
bargaining violations. Despite this, the clinic did not collaborate or
coordinate with other enforcement agencies or mechanisms to address these
intertwined issues.207 Moreover, to their great frustration, students were
frequently confronted with concrete examples of behavior that, while
morally repugnant, were not legally remediable.208 Students were vexed by
cases in which they believed discrimination had occurred, yet they could
not marshal enough admissible and credible evidence to sustain a claim.209
Even when sufficient evidence existed, students encountered complainants
who elected not to go forward with a legally viable case for reasons
unrelated to the merit or value of the case. The considerations were not
always comprehensible or rational to the students. For example, some
complainants lacked the endurance to withstand the considerable stress and
time commitment attendant to litigation;210 were conflict-avoidant or
culturally averse to challenging authority; felt bullied by opposing counsel
or the process of administrative adjudication; did not wish to subject
206. Thomas D. Barton, Conceiving the Lawyer as Creative Problem Solver: Introduction, 34
CAL. W. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998) (arguing that problem-solving is a powerful tool for lawyers “who
seek to examine how law and the legal process may contribute to effective, respectful, inclusive ways to
resolve personal and social problems”).
207. I do not mean to imply that other avenues for redressing those grievances did not exist. For
example, the Attorney General’s Office has a division dedicated to enforcing wage and hour violations.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 148 (West 2004). However, requiring complainants to pursue
individual remedies against the same employer in multiple venues, repeat the facts with different
advocates, and understand and comply with varying enforcement procedures could certainly chill their
enthusiasm to proceed on all fronts.
208. For example, the clinic had a case in which the students felt that an elderly, long term
employee of a company was immorally discharged due to absences related to medical treatment, yet
legal liability was dubious.
209. See supra note 152 and accompanying text; see also infra note 211, 213 (discussing the
difficulty in prevailing on discrimination claims).
210. In the MCAD context, as with litigation, aggrieved parties often perceive an interminable
delay between filing a complaint, adjudication at public hearing, issuance of a decision and the
exhaustion of the appeals process. These delays can be compounded by potential problems with
collecting of damages and bankrupt respondents, which can make pursuit of vindication at hearing a
fairly unappealing prospect.
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friends, family or former coworkers to the adversarial process; feared
retaliation; settled for far less than their cases warranted due to imminent
financial crisis; or had other compelling concerns about the process or
ramifications of vindicating their rights.211 These extra-legal factors and
exigencies that influence both the course of litigation and the attainment of
a just result are present in the real world but cannot be fully reflected in law
school hypotheticals.
c. Corrective strategies often did not foster change in individuals or
society
The clinic highlighted the inability of the law to reform the behavior
or beliefs of individual malefactors. When settling cases, students often
encountered respondents whose belligerence and adamant denial of
wrongdoing evinced their intent to settle for nuisance value only, in order
to avoid publicity or for some other reason unrelated to their recognition of
the claim’s merit. In these cases, the quest for rehabilitation was
chimerical.212 Limited in scope by resource issues, MCAD’s investigation
and enforcement mechanisms were a source of frustration for some
students. Of the instances in which discriminatory conduct is alleged or
perceived, only a subset file claims, and only in a fraction of those claims is
probable cause found.213 Some complainants who chose not to pursue
administrative redress of their grievances were intimidated by the process
or deterred by unclean hands, which allowed respondents to violate the law
with impunity. Accordingly, only a percentage of alleged perpetrators of
discrimination are subject to administrative investigation and adjudication
by MCAD. Even when a complainant prevailed, and MCAD imposed
equitable remedies, the agency lacked the resources to monitor equitable
211. See Lester, supra note 150, at 654. In her study about sexual orientation discrimination cited
supra, Toni Lester speculates on this topic:
Many claimants likely dropped out of the MCAD process without ever settling their claims or
waiting for a formal hearing. This could have occurred for a variety of reasons that have
nothing to do with the feasibility or credibility of their accusations. Potential reasons for
declining to pursue a discrimination claim with MCAD include stress, the fear of being outed,
or frustration over having to wait so long to get their “day in court.”
Id.
212. This extends beyond liability disclaimers that are standard fare in settlement agreements. It
can be argued that irrespective of a respondent’s failure to recognize and acknowledge wrong-doing, the
costs incurred by litigating and settling, however minimal, may serve to deter future illegal behavior,
even if the underlying attitude has not changed. Conversely, the significant expense of litigation, absent
introspection, may serve to drive invidious attitudes further underground. Rather than enlightening
defendants, litigation may educate employers on how to avoid litigation rather than how to avoid
discrimination.
213. Although it varies, the rate at which probable cause is found is typically small, and it does
not include cases that are screened out for jurisdictional defects or the presumably significant number of
people who never come forward to file a complaint.
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sanctions in any but the most egregious of cases. This phenomenon
obviously pervades the legal system more generally and militates in favor
of an approach to social change that extends beyond traditional rightsbased strategies.214
In addition to considering the impact on clients and the community, an
important social justice goal is “to empower students: to encourage them
and give them a sense of optimism and confidence as they contemplate
careers in public interest law.”215 In many of the cases handled at the
clinic, redressing a legal violation after it occurred may have had limited
impact, since adjudicating discrimination cases ex post facto did little to
foster meaningful social change. For some students, this realization
generated feelings that a more sweeping reform agenda is futile. Susan
Sturm criticizes the pursuit of workplace equity by plaintiffs’
discrimination attorneys because of their over-reliance on redressing
grievances that have already occurred, as they “continue to operate within a
rule-enforcement framework.”216 As she notes, “[l]egal advocacy on
behalf of workers tends to be litigation-centered, individualistic,
compensatory, and focused on after-the-fact enforcement of rule
violations.”217 At first blush, discrimination laws garnered some successes.
However, while overt acts of discrimination have diminished, subterranean
and subconscious animus have exacted an equally insidious toll because
more subtle discrimination is ultimately neither less offensive nor less
destructive.218 Sturm characterizes this change as the transition from “first
generation” to “second generation” discrimination:
Cognitive bias, structures of decisionmaking, and patterns of interaction
214. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 93, at 259-60 (“[A] group of scholars critiqued the practice of
public interest lawyering that grew up after the success of the Brown litigation as ineffective in
achieving its objectives, counterproductive in diverting resources away from progressive goals, and
conservative in reinforcing the power of existing institutional arrangements and structures of
subordination.”).
215. Kotkin, supra note 32, at 139.
216. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 546 (2001).
217. Id.
218. See Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and
Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 752-53 (2001). As Chamallas notes:
Two themes are often sounded in the critical commentaries: 1) new-style discrimination is
pervasive yet subtle and hard to distinguish from “normal” ways of doing business and
interacting socially, and 2) despite several decades of enforcement of antidiscrimination laws,
entrenched forms of bias are not just being phased out, but are simultaneously being
reproduced in updated forms.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1217
(1995) (“The overwhelming conclusion is that there now exists a fundamental ‘lack of fit’ between the
jurisprudential construction of discrimination and the actual phenomenon it purports to represent.”).
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have replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier of much
continued inequality.
....
The complex and dynamic problems inherent in second generation
discrimination cases pose a serious challenge for a first generation
system that relies solely on courts (or other external governmental
institutions) to articulate and enforce specific, across-the-board rules.219

Although enforcement of laws still plays a crucial role in combating
discrimination, it is a flawed and ultimately ineffectual strategy to pursue in
isolation.220
d. The clinic’s lack of community lawyering and multidisciplinary
problem-solving
As with many intractable social problems, the challenges facing many
MCAD complainants extended far beyond the legal problem handled by
the agency.221 Although the agency’s charge was broader than mere
investigation and adjudication of complaints, the day-to-day demands of
processing thousands of discrimination complaints often forced the agency
to focus its limited resources on the resolution of the individual disputes of
the complainants rather than undertake ambitious, proactive litigation
permitted under the agency’s authority. While the substantive limitations
are linked inextricably with the agency’s mission, expertise and resources,
an approach that treats complainants only as subject-specific cases can
detract from complete resolutions of complaints’ legal difficulties,
ultimately doing little to improve their circumstances.222 Given MCAD’s
limitations, the clinic did not incorporate components dealing with
219. Sturm, supra note 216, at 460-61.
220. In considering whether litigation alone can alter the social landscape, there are parallels to
the analysis of societal progress commonly attributed to the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Commentators have noted that the desegregation decision reflected, rather than
precipitated, a major shift in public opinion. E.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the
Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 13-14 (1994) (“The reason the Supreme Court could
unanimously invalidate public school segregation in 1954, while unanimously declining to do so just
twenty-seven years earlier, was that deep-seated social, political, and economic forces had already
begun to undermine traditional American racial attitudes.” (citation omitted)).
221. See Enos & Kanter, supra note 97, at 84 (discussing this issue and positing that “[c]lients
dealing with complex and multidimensional problems need service providers who approach problemsolving in a way that is client-centered, client-empowering, and incorporates multidisciplinary and
community-based solutions and resources”).
222. For a discussion on the importance of communication and listening skills in a legal setting,
see Barry et al., supra note 17, at 65-71. In addition, they note that “[i]nterdisciplinary clinical
programs offer many opportunities for the acquisition of valuable skills by means of collaboration with
and exposure to the culture, professional strengths, and limitations of other disciplines in a group
setting.” Id. at 69.
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community education,223 community outreach,224 organizing225 or any
other law reform agenda.226
Through this exclusive focus on individual cases, the clinic students’
actual legal work ran afoul of the goals of community lawyering.227 This
omission was unfortunate:
Larger community service projects have the benefit of engaging students
in social justice issues, and giving them a personal stake in evaluating

223. In describing its mission, MCAD highlights its efforts to incorporate outreach and other
affirmative measures aimed at preventing discrimination. MCAD, WELCOME TO THE MCAD,
http://www.mass.gov/mcad/welcome.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006). “The agency strives to
innovate, wherever possible, pioneering proactive measures, while reaching out to citizens and
businesses alike in order to meet the ever increasing demand for its services.” MCAD, HISTORY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, http://www.mass.gov/mcad/history.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2006). The clinic students endeavored to expand the impact of the cases by
demanding equitable relief, including policy changes, training and education that would benefit the
broader community. While they serve important goals, these measures primarily educate the public
about the agency and the laws it enforces rather than organizing a broader societal or grass-roots
community response to discrimination. MCAD also had the authority to initiate complaints in
compelling cases. However, given the chronic resource shortages, the staff was typically under
considerable pressure to manage the existing caseload, with little time to proactively and aggressively
seek out violations.
224. See Calmore, supra note 115, at 1936 (commenting that “lawyers must know how to work
with the client community, not just on its behalf”).
225. Cf. Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots
Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV.
775, 775 (1998) (illustrating the collaborative efforts of broad-based community advocates to adopt a
strategy intended to “provide a window into the social relations and processes underlying distributive
inequities and, thus, assist reformers in identifying the types of policy reforms likely to help achieve
environmental justice”).
226. Cf. Krieger, supra note 218, at 1241-44 (proposing modifications to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which has many parallels to chapter 151B of the Massachusetts General Laws, in
response to the law’s failure to reckon with the structural flaws that deeply diminish its efficacy).
Krieger posits that “[o]ur antidiscrimination jurisprudence has failed to adequately address this new
type of disparate treatment discrimination, to think rigorously about it, and to fashion doctrine equipped
to reckon with it.” Id. at 1241. For further discussion, see also Sturm, supra note 216, at 552-53.
Sturm criticizes the EEOC because the agency does not consistently aggregate and analyze information
on race and gender patterns. She notes, however, that some offices, operating without obvious sanction
from Washington, have implemented “more proactive, interactive, and deliberative forms of
involvement.” Id. But see Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 671 (2005) (arguing that the EEOC is still an important tool in the fight to
eradicate employment discrimination, given the breadth of the problem and the agency’s role in
processing complaints, vindicating the public interest, undertaking systemic litigation, utilizing broad
equitable powers and serving as a resource with considerable institutional expertise).
227. See Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L.
REV. 147, 158-62 (2000) (outlining some components of community lawyering, which include
facilitating interactions between clients with similar issues, in order to build a sense of solidarity and
foster lay advocacy). Although the clinic may have been able to undertake some of these efforts
irrespective of MCAD’s resource strains, we would have had to operate with care so as not to appear
overly partisan.
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and creating solutions to those problems, in [a] way that it is not possible
to achieve by working solely within the individual case model, on a
caseload purposely limited to focus students on the skills and values of
individual representation.228

Scholars and activists studying the efficacy of adversarial and
litigation-based approaches have urged the expansion of strategies aimed at
both individual justice and broader social reform. 229 These tactics often
involve broader initiatives aimed at comprehensive problem-solving by
integrating other disciplines and community actors into reform efforts.
Because the clinic was not involved in other efforts of law reform, nor was
it involved in challenging structural and societal impediments to combating
discrimination, the students were not given the opportunity to “understand
that social action lawyering takes place in the community as well as in the
courts.”230 Moreover, modeling a paradigm of representation that severs a
discrete legal issue from similar cases, isolates similarly aggrieved parties
and ignores the broader social context can foster detached lawyering. This
dynamic is a particularly compelling reason to engage students in
collaborating with other community groups and devoting resources to client
empowerment strategies.231

228. Katherine R. Kruse, Biting Off What They Can Chew: Strategies for Involving Students in
Problem-Solving Beyond Individual Client Representation, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 405, 411 (2002). For
comprehensive reference guides to law and organizing, see generally Loretta Price & Melinda Davis,
Seeds of Change: A Bibliographic Introduction to Law and Organizing, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 615 (2000).
229. See e.g., LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING, supra note 114. For a discussion addressing a
different criticism of legal services practice, see Paul R. Tremblay, The Crisis of Poverty Law and the
Demands of Benevolence, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 767 (1997).
The sublimation argument says that the real reason the power structure has invited and
permitted the funding of legal aid is that law offices in poor communities serve to forestall
insurrection. Legal aid offers a patina of justice, a convenient deception that implies to the
power structure that poor people are treated with the same respect as the rest of the world. If
a poor person loses public benefits or forfeits her right to stay in her apartment, those actions
should not really be perceived as “unjust” because the government has established law firms
ready and able to protect those poor people who need it most. This image of free legal
services diverts creative, rebellious energy away from true social change and towards
incremental, “regnant” change.
Id. at 771-72 (footnotes omitted).
230. Kotkin, supra note 32, at 140.
231. Another more nuanced disadvantage of a clinic that functions in isolation is that the students
are denied the opportunity to engage in collaborative lawyering. In this model, I served as their only
role model. Although students worked in teams and benefited from the experience of their student
peers, they had no basis to compare the instruction I modeled to that of other practitioners (other than
those that we encountered as opposing counsel, which is not a complete picture of advocacy). Although
I strive to be mindful of this limitation and to distinguish between stylistic differences and those that
breach clear boundaries of acceptable behavior, this is necessarily influenced by my own biases and
perceptions. Moreover, it is generally difficult for clinic students to effectively critique the
performance of their supervisor/professor, given the structural power imbalance. See Robert J. Condlin,
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e. The law’s inability to heal
The clinic created a forum for students to discover that even a
complete legal victory is an inadequate mechanism to rectify perceived
wrongs, and students witnessed firsthand the inability of the law to fully
restore a complainant to wholeness.232 Even when complainants achieved
the outcome they specifically articulated at the outset, students were
enlightened with the recognition that complainants are often not “healed”
by attaining their initial goals.233 A significant monetary award does not
necessarily compensate victims for their pain, nor do existing remedies
facilitate therapeutic or comprehensive relief.234 This insight is crucial, as
some lawyers compartmentalize their clients’ cases by focusing on strictly
legal conceptions and excluding equally important psychological needs,
which may ignore or even inflame clients’ emotional distress.235 Parallel to
objections voiced about litigation, complaining parties often experience the
formal “alternative” dispute resolution process as traumatizing and
coercive,236 and the parties perceive themselves as doubly victimized, first
by the defendant and then by the adjudicative system. At times the
students were palpably frustrated when a complainant’s experience and
preferences did not harmonize with their own assessment of a fair outcome
“Tastes Great, Less Filling”: The Law School Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45, 55
(1986) (noting how clinicians and students have “different levels of experience, status, perspective, and
formal authority, and in each of these categories teachers have the upper hand . . . . Clinicians
sometimes pretend that they are no different from their students, but this usually appears patronizing or
silly . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
232. MCAD did consider an innovative program aimed at rectifying the shortcomings of
administrative adjudication. Charles E. Walker, Chair of MCAD in 1999, proposed a “Truth
Commission and Reconciliation Model”; this was based on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
South Africa, which envisioned a program of restorative justice that acknowledged the role of
reconciliation within the structure of a law enforcement paradigm. See Jamie L. Wacks, A Proposal for
Community-Based Racial Reconciliation in the United States Through Personal Stories, 7 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 195, 244-45 (2000). The proposal aspired to facilitate healing and was directed toward
complainants who were “particularly interested in experiencing restorations of their dignity.” Id. at
246. At the time of his article, Wacks did not know if the proposal had been implemented. Id. at 24445 n.162. During my four-year tenure serving as Volunteer Commission Counsel, I had not heard of
the program.
233. For a discussion on trauma suffered by complainants, see Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the
Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L.
REV. 1401, 1474-77 (2004). “From the victim’s standpoint, it has been shown that losing one’s job is
one of the most traumatic things that a person can undergo. Jobs in modern societies are closely tied to
our sense of self and self-esteem.” Id. at 1474 (footnote omitted).
234. See Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy,
91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1273 (2006) (“Commodified concepts of compensation may provide some
measure of recompense for physical injuries, but they do little to redress emotional and psychological
wounds.”)
235. See id. (discussing the importance of attending to these psychological needs).
236. See generally Winick, supra note 105.
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that they believed should provide total relief. In these instances, their
exposure to the complex emotional reaction of the complainant imparted an
important and enduring lesson. Because a facile and flawed conception of
complainants can reduce them to little more than the sum and merit of their
legal issues, students should refrain from reductionist thinking.237 They
should be sensitized to the importance of attending to the whole client,
including their emotional well-being.238
f. The increasing relevance of transnational issues
The Anti-Discrimination Clinic did not expose students to the
interrelationship between local poverty and globalization.239 Admittedly, it
would be challenging for any clinic to untie the Gordian knot that connects
poverty in one’s own community and global economic integration.
Nevertheless, these concerns are noteworthy.
The increasing
interdependency of the current global economy renders it impossible to
develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to address the myriad
issues that affect our low-income and subordinated client communities
without a full understanding of their global context.240 Numerous scholars
point out the importance of recognizing the ubiquitous impact of
transnational capitalism and argue that public interest lawyers must reckon
with the scope and impact of globalization in order to be effective, as “[t]he
future of lawyering for lower income people will be linked both to

237. See J. Michael Norwood & Alan Paterson, Problem-Solving in a Multidisciplinary
Environment? Must Ethics Get in the Way of Holistic Services?, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 337, 341 (2002)
(calling for holistic lawyering, which is lawyering that first recognizes that clients often have both legal
and other needs for which the representing practitioner cannot provide services, and then attempts to
address these needs, often in partnership with non-lawyers). The article analyzes the ethical
conundrums facing lawyers engaging in this type of practice, but urges the profession to continue to
address and resolve the impediments to effective problem-solving. See id. at 371-72.
238. See supra notes 115-125 and accompanying text (referencing alternative lawyering models).
239. For a discussion on social movements as they relate to globalization, see Fran Ansley,
Inclusive Boundaries and Other (Im)possible Paths Toward Community Development in Global World,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 405-11 (2001).
240. See Lucie E. White, Facing South: Lawyering for Poor Communities in the Twenty-first
Century, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 813, 814 (1998).
[T]o talk realistically about “Lawyering for Poor Communities in the Twenty-first Century,”
we must expand our frame of reference beyond the world of service-eligible client groups that
we have traditionally represented in poverty law practices . . . to include all of the people who
are being rendered destitute by current policies of global economic integration, regardless of
which side of the territorial borders of the United States and other rich countries their bodies
happen to fall on at any particular moment of time . . . . [W]e must add the idea of global
equity to the core normative commitments that motivate our work.
Id. at 814; see also Claudio Grossman, Building the World Community: Challenges to Legal Education
and the WCL Experience, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 815 (2002) (explaining Washington College of
Law’s pedagogical response to global developments and the obligation of law schools to train students
to practice in “the new world reality”); Hurwitz, supra note 97.
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understanding the global economy and cooperating with lawyers for poor
people across national borders.”241
As Fran Ansley concedes, persuading marginalized communities to
recognize the connection between their immediate woes and issues of
globalization would be challenging for a variety of reasons.242 First, it is
difficult to compel people to see beyond their own immediate misery to
develop compassion and empathy for those even less fortunate and
privileged.243 Second, issues of nationalism may serve to downplay the
extent and detrimental impact of U.S. economic hegemony.244 Third, it is a
daunting prospect to rouse people who may perceive that they are acting
against their own self-interest.245 Finally, the lack of immediacy in these
issues and the complexity of the interrelationship between local and global
issues makes developing a viable strategy seem insurmountable.246 Ansley,
however, provides a compelling response to the voices of skepticism:
[A]t least for currently disempowered communities, there is no
alternative. Unless poor and working-class people in the world’s North
achieve the capacity to see themselves in a global context, it will be
flatly impossible for them to build organizations that are strong enough
to defend their interests or to carry out successful campaigns for
economic justice.247

Most clinics are vulnerable to this criticism, and many social justice
activists argue that this omission will render more localized efforts
ultimately ineffectual.
g. A rights-based strategy is ultimately limited in this context
Relying on a rights-based strategy to combat discrimination in the
MCAD context illustrated the limitations of this approach as a clinical

241. Louise G. Trubek, U.S. Legal Education and Legal Services for the Indigent: A Historical
and Personal Perspective, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 381, 392 (1994).
242. Ansley, supra note 239, at 405.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 405-06.
245. See id. at 406.
246. See id.
247. Id. For more on these and similar considerations, see also Barry et al., supra note 17. As
they observe:
Whether focused on private law and international economic relationships, public law and
transnational problems, or public interest or poverty law implications, the inevitable move
towards globalization will require that lawyers acquire the skills needed for these new
practice settings. . . . As the division of the academy that focuses on professional skills
development, clinical education will inevitably play a crucial role in imparting the new skills
and values needed for competent, ethical and reflective practice of law in the increasing
number of settings and situations created by globalization.
Id. at 59 (footnotes omitted).

80

REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

[Vol. 16:1

model. These limitations were present on a structural level, in terms of the
clinic’s ability to contribute to social change, and on an individual level, in
terms of the clinic’s ability to provide meaningful and systematic relief to
victims of discrimination. As with most challenges in clinical teaching,
these shortcomings can often be parlayed into important teaching moments.
However, because advancing social justice is an important goal, I would
prefer tangible progress toward achieving social change over a critique of
how the law and legal institutions fail to promote this goal.
6. The Dynamics of the Attorney-Client Relationship
In introducing students to the dynamics of the “attorney-client
relationship” as government lawyers, the clinic modeled a precedent that
was incongruous with the directives of client-centered lawyering.
Commission Counsel serve as government lawyers who represent the
interests of the complainants only as long as they are not dissonant with the
priorities of MCAD. Accordingly, the students owed no professional duty
of loyalty to the complainants. 248 Although the cases were initiated by
complainants, the agency’s mission is to vindicate the public interest rather
than to serve as a proxy for enforcing the individual rights of the
complainants. In discussing clinics that are not structured as direct client
representation models, Stephen Wizner and Jane Aiken note that those
clinical constructs “may convey to students the wrong message about the
correct motivation for doing the work, which is to use the legal system to
struggle for social justice for the poor, not to empower lawyers to
determine in the abstract what is in the public interest.”249 This criticism is
equally applicable to the Anti-Discrimination Clinic, in that MCAD, rather
than complainants, determined the agency’s agenda and defined the “public
interest.” As Commission Counsel, we endeavored to harmonize the
interests of the complainants with MCAD’s mission to ferret out and
eradicate discrimination. In application, we were able to provide some
satisfaction and relief to many complainants. Working on behalf of the
government, however, spared students from two important challenges—
248. Students often handled the cases in a manner that was consonant with the complainant’s
wishes and, perhaps to a large extent, how private counsel working on behalf of the complainant may
have proceeded. However, because students had no professional duty of loyalty to the client, the
absence of direct responsibility to the client circumvented important pedagogical opportunities. For a
discussion on the importance of these opportunities, see Wizner & Aiken, supra note 4, at 1008.
Wizner & Aiken note that it is essential to help “our students appreciate the broader lessons about
power and privilege, about their role in bringing about or inhibiting social justice. It is the sense of
responsibility that they feel, the fear, the vulnerability when representing real clients, that inspires
students to strive to be effective lawyers with excellent skills.” Id.
249. Id. at 1008 n.41.
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developing client-centered lawyering skills and learning to identify and
resolve the ethical issues that they will likely face in practice.250 As Stacy
Caplow observes in relation to prosecution clinics:
[S]tudents do not have an identifiable client (whether an individual or an
entity) so that many of the moral and ethical considerations that arise in
the context of legal representation are missing. Observations about and
reactions to these dilemmas often provide the richest fodder for both
formal and ad hoc discussions . . . .251

The students’ role as agency lawyers had implications both for the
complainants and the students.252 MCAD’s ability to vigorously pursue
each case filed was often hampered by inadequate resources. Once a
determination of probable cause had been issued, complainants were not
given the opportunity to decline student representation unless they retained
private counsel. Although complainants typically welcomed the clinic’s
assistance, some complainants resisted the prospect of student
representation. The underlying risk, however, is that both complainants
and students could reasonably labor under the impression that complainants
are coerced to accept a two-tiered system of justice: one consisting of those
who can afford their own attorney and are, therefore, free to determine the
objectives of their representation, and the other consisting of complainants
who lack the resources to retain private counsel and who may be
subordinated to MCAD’s mandate to act in the broad public interest, as
defined by the particular attorney making that determination.253 Perhaps

250. Although the students endeavored to ensure a just outcome for the complainants, the students
did not feel a sense of professional duty to respect the complainants’ prerogatives because the
complainants were not clinic clients. Accordingly, the students were shielded from some of the
pressures and challenges that accompany the obligation to satisfy the complex, and sometimes
conflicting, array of client needs.
251. Stacy Caplow, “Tacking Too Close to the Wind”: The Challenge to Prosecution Clinics to
Set Our Students On a Straight Course, 74 MISS. L.J. 919, 928 (2005).
252. We apprised complainants of the potential conflict from the outset. Complainants were
informed that they may face administrative closure for a variety of reasons, including, inter alia, their
failure to accept a settlement offer that MCAD deemed reasonable. See 804 MASS. CODE REGS.
1.15(6)(b) (1999) (stating that “[w]hen a formal offer of settlement by a respondent is acceptable to the
Commission but not to the complainant, the Commission may close the matter pursuant to 804 CMR
1.02 and 804 CMR 1.15(5)”). MCAD retains the right to impose this outcome on complainants
represented by private counsel as well, treating cases presented by Commission Counsel and private
counsel similarly. In practice, however, if a privately represented complainant holds out for the best
settlement, rather than accepting a reasonable outcome, it poses less of a threat to agency resources.
Presumably, in these circumstances, administrative closure is less likely to be invoked on those
grounds.
253. The vast majority of complainants professed their satisfaction with student representation
throughout the process. As in real practice, however, students occasionally bore the brunt of a
complainant’s dissatisfaction with legal reality.
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more disturbing from a pedagogical perspective, the clinic modeled a
paradigm of representation that is antithetical to client empowerment
strategies, one that risks silencing clients’ voices254 and relegating client
narratives to a secondary role.255 Despite my admonitions to the students
to be mindful of the way in which this dynamic conflicts with the precepts
of client-centered lawyering, the students were given a dangerous taste of
lawyer dominance.256
In managing cases exclusively as Volunteer Commission Counsel,
students were insulated from the total legal needs of a particular
complainant.257 In this decontextualized approach, the students were
circumscribed from identifying and providing comprehensive legal
services. The clinic’s specialization in one discrete aspect of law, primarily
employment discrimination, precluded attention to legal problems that were
often inextricably linked with the discrimination and that shared a nexus of
facts. As noted earlier, any legal or employment issue that did not fit
squarely into discrimination law was immaterial for the clinic students, as

254. For more discussion on the negative impact of suppressing client voices, see Lucie E. White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Survivor Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38
BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law, supra note 116, at 2119 (discussing the
injury to client integrity when clients’ voices are silenced).
255. A significant body of literature addresses the importance of eliciting, honoring and
preserving client narratives. See, e.g., Natasha T. Martin, Allegory from the Cave: A Story About a MisEducated Profession and the Paradoxical Prescription, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 381, 391 (2005)
(reviewing DERRICK BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION: LIVING A LIFE OF MEANING AND WORTH (2002))
(“Law school pedagogy includes narrative and storytelling which seek to further humanize the law and
to highlight its effects on individuals and institutions.”); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law
Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 861, 945 (1992) (“When lawyers misinterpret or subordinate client narratives, they disregard the
client’s narrative purpose and her perspective of the harm to be remedied, and may do violence to the
client’s normative values and beliefs.”).
But see Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Deconstructing
Reconstructive Poverty Law: Practice-Based Critique of the Storytelling Aspects of the Theoretics of
Practice Movement, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 889, 893 (1995) (“[A]pplication of a theory of poverty law
such as the one conceived by the theoretics of practice movement fails to take into consideration certain
realities of poverty law practice; derives from a singular, romanticized view of the poor; and actually
may frustrate client goals by eviscerating the raison d’etre of the attorney-client relationship” (footnote
omitted)).
256. For example, although it did not happen in any cases handled by the clinic, MCAD could
have elected to go forward in a case despite the complainant’s opposition, similar to prosecuting a
domestic violence case against the wishes of the victim.
257. For a discussion on the problems associated with such insulation, see Erik Luna, Punishment
Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205 (2003).
“The idea of holistic lawyering . . . suggests that legal practitioners should be client-centered in their
approach, viewing their responsibilities as not just solving issues of law but also helping address the
various problems (both legal and nonlegal) that have contributed to their client’s troubles.” Id. at 283.
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the clinic had neither the power nor the authority to seek redress.258 This
constraint is antithetical to whole-client lawyering and cross-substantive
representation, as the client’s legal reality outside those matters relevant to
the MCAD case was deemed inconsequential.259 Without fully grasping
the backdrop in which legal problems arise, a myopic focus on one discrete
legal issue can obscure other seemingly unrelated legal and non-legal
issues that are critical to client-centered counseling in general, and the
determination of an appropriate resolution tailored to the individual needs
of a particular client more specifically.260
Admittedly, given the
restrictions inherent in a one semester program with limited teaching and
supervisory resources, the concept of generalization could careen down the
slippery slope, obligating a clinic to address all the legal issues faced by
one client. To some degree, this constraint is present in all clinics and
routinely faced by lawyers in practice. Such an extreme result would be
counterproductive and inefficient, as it would be extremely difficult to
adequately coordinate and supervise a clinic envisioning such substantive
breadth, particularly given the resources WNEC allocates to its clinical
programming.261 However, a middle ground seems to be a reasonable
pedagogical goal that would model more comprehensive attention to client
needs, such as identifying other legal issues, developing a referral network
and soliciting community input in a legal needs assessment.262
258. Unfortunately, by editing complainants’ stories to fit only the legal theories addressed by
MCAD, students did not develop and refine critical listening skills and empathy. See Robert Dinerstein
et al., Connection, Capacity and Morality in Lawyer-Client Relationships: Dialogues and Commentary,
10 CLINICAL L. REV. 755, 755 (2004) (noting the “importance of a fundamental skill and virtue—
listening—in the lawyer’s work of creating, in each case, a theory of the representation”).
259. “Effective interpersonal relationships between lawyers and their clients are critical to the
satisfactory resolution of legal problems. As a result, some law professors focus upon the quality of the
lawyer-client relationship . . . [and thus] emphasize the lawyer’s ability to hear accurately and
understand completely the client’s problem[s] . . . .” Girth, supra note 79, at 606.
260. As a mitigating step, I considered training clinic students to identify issues and develop a
referral network. Steps as minimal as providing informational sheets on issues such as wage and hour
violations, workplace safety issues, unemployment, and immigration issues would have shed light on
these issues and provide critical information to aggrieved parties.
261. The University of New Mexico’s Community Lawyering Clinic set up an exemplary and
innovative program that now provides representation in matters including economic justice, juvenile
justice, women’s shelter issues, and issues associated with a senior center and a neighborhood
association, all of which results in a greatly diversified student caseload. See Lopez, supra note 186, at
315-16. Such a construct would not be viable at WNEC without a rotating group of willing professors
with varying areas of expertise.
262. Lopez underscores the pedagogical limitations associated with clinics that specialize in one
discrete area, stating that “[s]pecialization narrows the students’ ability to appreciate the client’s full
perspective and may limit problem solving and creativity.” Id. at 311. When students expect to address
one issue exclusively, they suppress the client’s voice by listening for facts and priorities that are
relevant only to the legal issue in which the clinic specializes. See id. at 316-18. She argues that “there
is pedagogical value in teaching students to see the relationships between all the problems faced by the
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7. The MCAD Model’s Pedagogical Benefits Were Outweighed by Social
Justice Concerns
As noted in the first three Sections, the Anti-Discrimination Clinic
presented the students with the opportunity to act as lawyers and engage in
a reasonably broad range of lawyering skills outlined in the MacCrate
Report. Moreover, there were reasonable opportunities to explore issues of
professionalism and multicultural sensitivity. However, the issue of loyalty
to the agency clouded the exploration of zealous representation to
individual clients. The latter part of this critique focused on social justice
considerations, including access to justice, limitations of rights-based
strategies and the attorney-client relationship. Although MCAD has a
worthy and important charge to act in the public interest, the AntiDiscrimination Clinic illustrated the difficulties of imparting social justice
values and goals while restricted by the mission and resources of an
administrative agency. Under the conception of social justice lawyering
outlined earlier, it would be difficult for a clinic embedded within an
administrative enforcement agency to pursue a transformative social justice
agenda. In sum, while the MCAD model did satisfy the goals of providing
a reasonable range of skills training opportunities and exposing students to
issues of ethics and professionalism, there were critical areas in which the
model was lacking, particularly with respect to inculcating values and
pursuing social justice objectives.
By necessity and design, clinicians are both adroit and resourceful in
salvaging “teaching moments” from even the worst of experiences. This
concept is central to clinical pedagogy, and indeed critical given our
inability to control what unfolds in real-life lawyering. However, I believe
that in certain instances it is preferable to model the desired behavior rather
than deconstruct and undo what students have learned, and I would have
favored more effective social justice outcomes.

poor and in attempting to craft solutions.” Id. at 324. Specialization isolates a client’s particular
problem and removes the students from the need to recognize the intersecting issues confronted by the
poor. Lopez also voices concern with the fact that race and other issues related to subordination can be
seen as decontextualized. See id. at 310 n.18. “Serving the needs of the client and community, rather
than the subject matter, allows students to see the race and gender issues in their full context and not as
decontextualized traditional ‘race’ cases that might be presented, for example, in a discrimination
clinic.” Id. at 321. While Lopez recognizes that specialization simplifies the process, she argues that
diversity is preferable. Id. at 324-25. Ultimately, Lopez concludes that clinics could best serve the dual
interests of skills training and a social justice focus by conferring with the local community to facilitate
a needs assessment, ultimately allowing for a clinic geared toward the community’s needs rather than
selecting a singular substantive area removed from the context of local needs. See id. at 325-26.

2006]

JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE

85

C. CONTEXT OF OTHER WNEC CLINICS
The process of evaluating a particular clinic’s balance of skills
training and social justice mission should be made in the context of the
entire clinical program at a law school.263 As law schools strive to offer an
appropriately diverse range of clinical perspectives and opportunities,
social justice goals should factor prominently in that mix.264 Accordingly,
while this critique focuses on the Anti-Discrimination Clinic, it cannot be
evaluated in isolation from the other clinics offered by the law school.265
In addition to the Anti-Discrimination clinic, WNEC’s clinical offerings
consisted of the Criminal Law Clinic,266 the Legal Services Clinic,267 the
Consumer Law Clinic,268 the Small Business Clinic,269 the Real Estate

263. See Mary A. Lynch, Designing A Hybrid Domestic Violence Prosecution Clinic: Making
Bedfellows of Academics, Activists and Prosecutors to Teach Students According to Clinical Theory
and Best Practices, 74 MISS. L.J. 1177, 1190 (2005) (“The clinic’s place in the larger community
should also be examined.”). See also Peter A. Joy, Prosecution Clinics: Dealing with Professional
Role, 74 MISS. L.J. 955, 960-62 (2005), who notes that clinics were traditionally premised on service to
underserved populations and many law school programs still reflect that commitment in their overall
programming. “Clinical legal education has developed and expanded in the last several decades, and
not every law school tailors all of its clinical courses to fit into the historical access to legal services
model underpinning the clinical legal education movement . . . .” Id. at 961-62. At WNEC, the law
school does not have a clinical director who defines the mission and goals of the overall program.
Accordingly, there is no one at WNEC responsible for articulating a cohesive clinical mission. Issues
related to alterations in the clinical construct must go to the curriculum committee and full faculty, with
deference given to the prerogative of each clinician.
264. In evaluating a law school’s clinical program, it is important to query whether “there [are] a
good number of projects which enable access to justice, raise social justice awareness and instill a
strong pro bono ethic?” Lynch, supra note 263, at 1190-91.
265. See Engler, supra note 33, at 150-51.
While the MacCrate report reminds us that no one size fits all, we should nonetheless be able
to articulate the justifications for a particular mix in a given context. The curricular
imperative becomes the design not simply of a course or clinic but a coherent program, based
on prioritized goals, that seeks to fill specific gaps within the realities of a given law school
context.
Id. (footnote omitted).
266. The Criminal Clinic was directed by a full-time clinical member of the faculty. Students
worked with the local District Attorney’s Office and were authorized to practice in the District Courts,
handling arraignments and prosecuting misdemeanor and felony cases in bench and jury trials.
267. Students who enrolled in the Legal Services Clinic were assigned to a substantive unit, where
they represented clients in family, housing, elder, employment or benefits cases. The seminar
component devoted time to issues of poverty law.
268. Students in the Consumer Clinic represented clients in consumer matters in small claims
court. Cases were selected in one of two ways: they were referred by the Springfield Mayor’s Office or
small claims court itself. The adjunct faulty member who directed the program was given access to the
docket and was able to contact potential clients, in order to offer assistance and/or representation in the
consumer matters pending before the court.
269. The Small Business Clinic was a transactional clinic that provided legal assistance to local
start-up businesses, while working in collaboration with Springfield Technical Community College,
which houses and supports a start-up business incubator.
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Practicum270 and an externship program.271 The Anti-Discrimination and
Criminal Law Clinics operated on fulltime in-house models, requiring a
significant commitment of faculty resources. The Small Business Clinic
and Real Estate Practicum were offered one semester per year, utilizing
fewer faculty resources. The Consumer Law and Legal Services Clinics
operated as external clinics.
Although the greatest allocation of faculty resources was devoted to
the two fulltime, in-house clinics, neither provided services that
ameliorated the problem of unmet legal needs, nor did these clinics provide
instruction in client-centered lawyering skills. In the Anti-Discrimination
Clinic, students only appeared in MCAD cases once a complainant was
entitled to Commission Counsel assistance, and thus the complainants
would have their cases prosecuted irrespective of the clinic’s
involvement.272 Further, complainants with meritorious cases were often
able to capitalize on fee-shifting provisions, enabling them to retain private
counsel.273 The Criminal Law Clinic assisted the District Attorney by
providing students that prosecuted cases under the supervision of a member
of the law school faculty. Since the District Attorney’s “client” is the state,
direct representation of individual clients was absent from this clinic
model. Moreover, given the nature of law enforcement, the cases would
have been prosecuted irrespective of the availability of student
representation. While this clinic provided unparalleled training in trial
skills and served as an invaluable asset to the law school’s overall clinical
program, the real commitment of student and faculty resources inured to

270. The Real Estate Practicum was structured as an externship model, and combined a classroom
component with field placements that were divided between attorneys practicing in the areas of
residential real estate and title insurance.
271. As then organized, the externship program was comprised of two parts: a Judicial Externship
Program that was supervised and administered by a Judicial Externship Director, who was a member of
the full time faculty, and clinical externships that were supervised by individual faculty members.
272. Commission Counsel assumed a partisan role after a Probable Cause Finding was issued.
But see Lester, supra note 150, at 672 (concluding that despite the availability of Commission Counsel
to prosecute cases, inadequate resources made it difficult to enforce laws). “Unfortunately, under such
circumstances, social change cannot occur, even if those delegated with the power to enforce it are well
meaning.” Id.
273. The fee-shifting provisions were intended to encourage private enforcement of civil rights.
See, supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (discussing fee-shifting statutes).
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the benefit of the District Attorney, not to underserved clients.274
Moreover, like the Anti-Discrimination Clinic, “[p]rosecution clinics . . . do
not provide opportunities to represent individuals and practice client
centered representation.”275
The law school offered two other in-house courses that provided
practical skills training. The Small Business Clinic provided assistance to
for-profit start-up companies. While this clinic assisted incipient for-profit
businesses with matters of corporate formation, it did not have an overt
social justice mission. The clinic was not geared toward affordable
housing, non-profits, or businesses whose mission directly benefited antipoverty efforts in local low-income communities. The Small Business
Clinic certainly satisfied the goal of promoting economic development,
undoubtedly producing an indirect economic benefit in the local
community. However, it did not have an explicit and intentional goal of
focusing its efforts on economic revitalization in impoverished
neighborhoods through grass-roots coalition building, the hallmark of
CED. Accordingly, while the Small Business Clinic clearly had a mission
that would inure to the benefit of the local community, it would not qualify
strictly within this article’s definition of a social justice mission. In the
Real Estate Practicum, students worked on residential real estate
conveyances under the supervision of local practitioners, who assigned
tasks arising from their regular caseload. Under this model, students were
provided training in a discrete substantive area. Although this model
presented a worthy educational enterprise, it did not espouse the explicit
goals of ensuring legal assistance to poor clients who would otherwise go
without representation, nor did it address the other social justice concerns
outlined above.
Although the two external clinics, the Consumer Protection and Legal
Services Clinics, served traditionally underrepresented clients, they
received the least amount of faculty attention and resources, and they may
274. See also Joy, supra note 263, at 962 (pointing out that “prosecution clinics are clinical
experiences that are not focused on direct services to clients otherwise unable to afford access to the
courts . . . “). He notes further that this divergence “departs from the historical pro bono legal service
performed by most clinical programs that expand direct access to the courts for those otherwise unable
to hire attorneys.” Id. at 963. But see Karen Knight, To Prosecute is Human, 75 NEB. L. REV. 847, 866
(1996), who argues:
Many victims of crime are members of traditionally underrepresented groups who are very
much in need of legal assistance. Women and children are frequently the victims of crimes
such as sexual assault, abuse, and domestic violence. Poor people and members of minority
populations are victimized in significant numbers. Assisting victims is compatible with the
desire to contribute effectively to the community by providing legal services that are needed
by vulnerable populations.
275. Lynch, supra note 263, at 1190.

88

REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

[Vol. 16:1

have been legitimately perceived as enjoying less institutional support than
the in-house programs. The Consumer Protection Clinic, operated by an
adjunct professor, was an effective vehicle for practical skills training.
Technically, the clinic served clients who might have otherwise appeared in
small claims court without representation. However, small claims court is
one of the few judicial forums in which parties may not be distinctly
disadvantaged by appearing without counsel, due to the relatively
uncomplicated claims and the fact that they often appear against equally
unsophisticated adversaries who appear pro se. Moreover, clients pursuing
cases in small claims court may be able to retain private counsel due to the
fee-shifting provisions of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act,
which was enforced by the Consumer Protection Clinic.276 Students
participating in the Legal Services Clinic did increase the availability of
legal services to traditionally indigent clients. However, the Legal Services
Clinic was fraught with problems that imperiled the law school’s
commitment of financial resources and left its future in doubt.
As outlined above, the Anti-Discrimination Clinic’s shortcomings
with respect to social justice goals were exacerbated by the inattention to
these goals in the law school’s other clinical programs. Accordingly,
rethinking the structure of this program was warranted.
IV. PERSPECTIVES ON AN UNSUCCESSFUL REMEDY
Despite my belief that the Anti-Discrimination Clinic’s balance of
skills training and social justice goals was not optimal, I was disinclined to
entirely abandon the clinic. The law school had developed a positive
institutional rapport with MCAD, and the agency had come to rely on the
students to manage much of the Springfield office’s litigation docket.
Accordingly, I endeavored to redesign the clinic to enhance the social
justice mission, without jettisoning MCAD.277 Given my interest in
combining individual representation with other strategies calculated to
achieve more far-reaching, comprehensive and enduring impact, I
contemplated a broader employment clinic as a logical extension of the
Anti-Discrimination Clinic. Heeding the admonitions of social justice
lawyers to reconceptualize the interplay between law and social change, I

276. See MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 93A (West 2004).
277. The Equal Justice Project acknowledged that legal services alone are not an adequate
mechanism to truly dismantle the barriers to justice for subordinated people, and urged a multidimensional approach. EQUAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 6, at 3. In considering various tactics,
including a law and organizing paradigm and community legal education, the Project concluded that the
conception of lawyering skills and instruction must be broadened. See id.
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favored a clinic construct that aspired to present an integrated and
comprehensive response to problems facing low-income clients.278 My
interest in expanding the clinic coincided with the work of a coalition of
local groups intended to address the concerns of low-wage workers. As the
economic picture continued to decline both locally and nationally,
problems facing low-wage and immigrant workers were worsening.279 The
area of workers’ rights seemed ripe for creative advocacy and in desperate
need of a coordinated strategy.
A community-based workers’ rights clinic would have provided a
coherent complement to the Anti-Discrimination Clinic, as discrimination
often coexists with other employment problems. Initially, it appeared both
auspicious and plausible to expand the clinic to encompass a general
employment focus, as an extension of the efforts, concepts and sentiments
generated by the organizers and participants in the Workers’ Rights
Conference.280 To that end, I attended numerous meetings with the Pioneer
278. See generally Doug Ewart, Parkdale Community Legal Services: A Dream That Died, 35
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 485 (1997) (arguing that Parkdale Community Legal Services, which endeavored
to function as a proactive community law office, failed in its mission to provide meaningful change for
its poor constituents). Ewart notes that the failure was due in part to the overemphasis on issues
specific to individuals, which precluded the advocates’ ability to effectively address the community’s
long-term needs. Id. See also Gordon, supra note 93, who asserts that pursuing vindication of
individual legal rights satisfies a very limited number of clients. She laments the unintentional result of
this strategy, in which clients who are more likely and able to assert their rights are effectively removed
from the pool of people agitating for broader justice, leaving fewer prospective recruits for mobilization
efforts. Id.
279. A combination of factors compounded the devastating impact on the poor of the general
economic downturn, including decreased wages, increased job losses and unemployment, reduced
money for education and training, the discontinuation of policies allowing education to qualify as
“work” under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), decreased daycare subsidies, and
many welfare recipients nearing or reaching the five-year lifetime limitation on the receipt of benefits.
The retrenched policies and economic realities painted a foreboding picture. Rather than attempt to
ameliorate root causes of poverty, the government retreated to the largely discredited and retrograde
distinctions between the deserving and undeserving poor, and characterized welfare as a cause of
poverty, not a response to it. See generally Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty
Strategy: Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J. 1697 (1993) (describing the evolution of the
government’s distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor). For a thorough discussion
documenting the fluctuating underpinnings of social welfare policy, including the conceptual shifts
between characterizing welfare as an entitlement versus social insurance, see MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN
THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1996).
280. The first concrete step involved working with a coalition of groups to organize a conference,
which was conceptualized as a forum to initiate a critical discourse on how to best serve the needs of
low-income workers in the Pioneer Valley, and to inspire broad-based community interest and
commitment to working on issues of economic justice. We hoped to fertilize nascent efforts by local
labor leaders, activists, community groups, and other interested constituencies to address these
problems. The group recognized that it was quixotic to believe that a community would seamlessly
coalesce. While the impediments were not inconsequential and warranted careful thought, a thorough
analysis is beyond the scope of this discussion. Our pluralistic approach included outreach to draw
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Valley Central Labor Council, the University of Massachusetts Labor
Center and representatives from activist community groups. A workers’
rights clinic could incorporate issues historically conceptualized within the
realm of poverty law, as many issues facing low-wage workers straddle the
typically separate, and occasionally conflicting, spheres of employment law
and poverty law.281 Moreover, such a construct could remedy some of the
deficiencies of the Anti-Discrimination Clinic noted above; and because it
arose organically out of local efforts, it would satisfy the goal of
responding to local needs. Over time, however, it became apparent that the
concept of a workers’ rights clinic was not viable for a variety of reasons,
including most prominently the dim prospects of fully funding the
initiative.
Ultimately, despite the important institutional relationship with
MCAD, the foregoing concerns contributed to my conclusion that the law
school’s clinical resources could be utilized more effectively to advance the
social justice goals outlined above. As a result of these and other
considerations, including concerns about the long term viability of the
Legal Services Program in the absence of a renewed faculty and
institutional commitment, the law school engaged in a major reorganization
of our civil clinical program, reallocating faculty resources from the Anti-

together disparate community groups including the Labor Center, the local labor council, community
and faith-based groups, low-wage workers, legal services, and academics experienced in law reform
efforts. As the process progressed, it was challenging to transcend the inevitable conflicts between the
occasionally competing visions espoused by the various participants. Moreover, it was difficult to
determine the manner in which the clinic and law school resources could be most effectively utilized,
while maintaining our duty to select pedagogically appropriate tasks for a group of students with
diverse professional interests. Also, the process was time-consuming and plagued with uncertainty due
to funding and governance issues that needed to be resolved. Ultimately, the workers’ rights model was
not a viable option in the short term.
281. See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, Toward New Strategies for Low-Wage Workers, 4 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 245 (1995). Klare notes that poverty law was traditionally conceptualized as encompassing issues
related to government entitlements, low-income workers and matters typically focusing on “housing,
consumer, family, immigration, and benefits issues.” Id. at 246-47. On the other hand, employment, or
at least labor law, was characterized as responding to issues affecting higher paid workers, and the
resulting tension often impeded collaboration between activists concerned about the contingent
workforce, those concerned with welfare-to-work transition and those concerned with organized labor.
See id. at 247-48. Although employment interests and the interests of welfare rights groups have been
characterized as at odds with each other, Klare urges lawyers to develop both legal and non-legal
strategies to build coalitions between themselves and their advocates. See id. at 269-70. In this way,
they can address the myriad of issues that affect both constituencies, including workplace safety,
workers’ compensation, wage and hour violations, transportation, health care, child care, the impact of
globalization, and the increasing prevalence of a contingent and immigrant workforce. See id.
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Discrimination Clinic to the Legal Services Clinic and a newly designed
Public Interest Externship Program.282
V. CONCLUSION
This article chronicles one clinician’s efforts to apply contemporary
clinical and social justice theory to an unflinching critique of one clinical
program. While the Anti-Discrimination Clinic satisfied some reasonable
pedagogical goals and fit within the broad definition of public interest
work, it fell short of an ambitious and visionary social justice mission.
Ultimately, locating a clinic within an administrative agency impeded the
school’s ability to inculcate fundamental values, including client-centered
lawyering, and failed to provide legal services to underrepresented
populations and address unmet legal needs. It is not inconceivable to
construct a clinic within an administrative agency that furthers important
social justice goals. However, one can extrapolate from the experiences
and analysis of the Anti-Discrimination Clinic that a clinic embedded
within an administrative agency may present insurmountable structural
challenges to advancing a transformative social justice agenda.
Within the renaissance of poverty law scholarship, clinicians must
answer the call to act as conscientious and reflective practitioners.283 As
we strive to develop multidisciplinary and inclusive solutions, we must rely
on insights painfully extracted from historical failures of poverty-law
advocacy and clinical pedagogy, candidly exposing our missteps as we go.
We cannot be complacent, but rather must leverage the resources of the
academy in order to provide a meaningful educational service to the
students, aid the local community and contribute to the larger movement
for social justice. Despite the daunting nature of the problem and the
challenges intrinsic to seeking solutions, we must soldier on with ambitious
goals, unwavering commitment and a sharp, self-reflective focus.

282. The full circumstances and details surrounding this reorganization are beyond the scope of
this paper.
283. See Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Scholarship and the Social Justice Mission, 40 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 469 (1992) (noting that clinicians are well placed to contribute to social justice scholarship, and
should be collecting and sharing empirical data that analyzes the efficacy of public interest lawyering
strategies ).

